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Estimations of time and number share many similarities in both non-humans and man.
The primary focus of this review is on the development of time and number sense
across infancy and childhood, and neuropsychological ﬁndings as they relate to time and
number discrimination in infants and adults. Discussion of these ﬁndings is couched
within a mode-control model of timing and counting which assumes time and number
share a common magnitude representation system. A basic sense of time and number
likely serves as the foundation for advanced numerical and temporal competence, and
aspects of higher cognition—this will be discussed as it relates to typical childhood, and
certain developmental disorders, including autism spectrum disorder. Directions for future
research in the developmental neuroscience of time and number (NEUTIN) will also be
highlighted.
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INTRODUCTION
The interval timing and numerical abilities identiﬁed in non-
human animals, human infants, and children may represent bio-
logical and developmental precursors of adults’ highly developed
computational abilities (Buhusi and Cordes, 2011; Lustig, 2011;
Williams,2011).Forinstance,attheperceptuallevel,non-humans
andinfantsappearcapableofmakingmagnitudeestimatesofdura-
tion, numerosity and area (i.e., that a given stimulus is presented
for “more” time than another, or contains “more” elements—this
basic ability is the focus of our review). The ability to imagine
events in the future (which must by implication, require some
form of internal time sense) has been postulated to be related to
ourabilityto“anticipatefuturementalprocessesandmotivational
and emotional states” (Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011:1), and adults at
leastappearabletocomprehendmetaphysicalandhigherconcepts
of time and space (e.g., imagining the size of the galaxy, or how
long it has been around). It seems parsimonious to suppose that
the basic ability to represent time, space and numerosity is a basic
developmental “building block” for math ability, and abstract
mental representations and concepts of metaphysical time and
space (see Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008).
The processing of sensory information according to its spatial,
temporal, and numerical properties is a requirement of the cen-
tral nervous system. Navon (1978) “considered the issue of how
weapprehendstimulithatvaryalongseveraldimensions.Wemay
often overlook some aspects, and sometimes be unable to ignore
others” (1978:3). He suggested that time occupies the dominant
dimension, followed byspace. Innon-humans andhumans,there
are a variety of interaction effects between our estimates of time,
space, and number, and these have been taken as support for
mode-control models of (sensory) time and number perception
(e.g., Meck and Church, 1983), and those that suppose our abil-
ity to make sense of time, space, and numerosity develops from
a single magnitude processing system (A Theory of Magnitude,
ATOM; Walsh, 2003). In fact, in humans at least, they are most
likely component processes in a cognitive system: a “raw sub-
strate” magnitudeestimate oftime andnumber is likelyprocessed
by some ordinal magnitude comparator (which is recruited to
make “how much” or “more than and less than” judgments) that
apparently deals with many different dimensions (time, space,
numerosity, loudness andluminance, andevenemotional expres-
sion; e.g., see Smith andSera,1992; Holmes andLourenco, 2009).
Although ATOM assumes that “time and quantity estimation
operate on similar and partly shared accumulation principles” of
the type described in the mode-control model, these two forms
of account (Meck and Church, 1983; Walsh, 2003)m a yb et h e -
oretically dissociated at the developmental level—for instance,
the mode-control model assumes numerosity is the product of
an internal (primitive) count, which is “built in,” and accord-
ing to ATOM, numerosity is acquired by learning associations
between magnitudes of different dimensions, as “specializations
fortime, spaceandquantitydevelopfromasingle magnitudesys-
tem operating from birth” (2003:484). ATOM does not describe
the nature of a shared accumulation system as the mode-control
model does. ATOM grounds the ontogeny of multi-dimension
magnitude estimation abilities on the basis of the need for action,
and the translation from sensory to motor, and this is germane
to infant development (i.e., Piaget’s sensorimotor stage from 0 to
2 years). It is reasoned in ATOM that the infant is born with a
“one-bit” magnitude system, and number sense is mapped onto
the magnitude system, which is argued to have a spatial basis
(given its emphasis for action).
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The primary focus of our review is how we develop the abil-
ity to integrate (or “stitch together”) representations of duration
and numerosity magnitudes, operating at the level of processing
incoming sensory input, couched within the inﬂuential “mode-
control” approach (Meck and Church, 1983). This assumes the
substrate for time and number judgments can be represented by
an “accumulated” magnitude, and there is quantitative equiva-
lence between an estimate of number and a unit of time (Meck
et al., 1985)—space (area) will also be discussed but to a lesser
extent (but see Gallistel, 1989). Accordingly, we refer to “time”
(time sense) as the ability to estimate duration magnitude in the
seconds to minutes range, and “number” (number sense) as the
abilityto estimate non-symbolic numerosity (i.e., number ofdots
in an array).
There are three main areas of coverage in this review:
1. We discuss animal ﬁndings relating to the neuroscience of
time and number sense (NEUTIN), and comparable human
studies of time, space, and number magnitude estimation
in infants and adults. We also highlight cross-dimensional
interaction effects (e.g., between time, space, and number) in
non-humans and humans.
2. We review the “mini-evolution” of the development of time
and number sense in infancy and childhood. We also com-
ment on the correspondence between number sense and
more advanced numerical abilities (symbolic representations
of number, counting, math ability), and how children are
considered to develop higher-order concepts of time, speed,
distance and space.
3. Children with developmental disabilities, particularly those
with difﬁculties as they relate to time and number abilities
(developmental dyscalculia,autism, attention-deﬁcit hyperac-
tivity disorder, Down and Williams syndrome) will also be
discussed. Studying the atypical development of NEUTIN has
the potential to developmentally tease apart the aforemen-
tioned accounts, but also to improve understanding of these
disorders and their therapeutic and educational remediation.
With the exception of Williams and Down syndrome (which
have a genetic basis), the disorders included in this review
are characterized on the basis of observable behavioral (rather
than biomedical) features, and as such, it is useful to know
the extent of sensitivity and adaption to time, numerosity and
space in these populations—as these types of impairments
mightcontributetoclinicalsymptoms (andhavea“knock-on”
effect in development; see also Williams, 2011).
BASIC APPROACH TO TEMPORAL AND NUMERICAL
INTEGRATION
The psychological process of actively representing time and num-
ber magnitude estimations (see Meck et al., 1985), and the
form this integration may take, is expected to be among the
premier topics to unite systems, cellular, computational, and
c o g n i t i v en e u r o s c i e n c ef o rt h ef o r e s e e a b l ef u t u r e( Meck, 2003).
Temporal processing has been a topic of interest since the dawn
of modern experimental psychology—perhaps as a function of
its ties to philosophy and physics involving the investigation of
absolute vs. relative time perception (Myers, 1971; Wackermann,
2008; Buhusi and Meck, 2009a,b; Lustig, 2011)a sw e l la st h e
impressive ability of humans and other animals to learn and
adapt to the temporal and numerical qualities of environmental
events (Skinner, 1938; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1997). The
mode-control model (for time and number) is related to “scalar
expectancy theory” (SET; for time only, Gibbon et al., 1984).
These types of accounts were stimulated by studies of rodents
(and pigeons) operating on ﬁxed-interval schedules (an event
occurs at a ﬁxed period in time). With training, rats and pigeons
demonstrate “expectancy” (or anticipation) of an event around
t h et i m ei ti ss c h e d u l e d( Church and Gibbon, 1982; Roberts and
Boisvert, 1998), and the accuracy of their temporal expectancies
(duration judgment) can be neuropsychologically manipulated
(e.g., by pharmacological agents, task load, sensory qualities; e.g.,
see Meck, 1983, 1996). Their behavioral expectancies conform to
the scalar property (discussed in the next section). Animals also
appear to perform “superstitious behaviors” (Skinner, 1948)o r
sequences of actions to “count” (or parse) the passage of time
(Killeen and Fetterman, 1988). Rats, pigeons, and monkeys can
also discriminate the number of entities in a set when non-
numerical dimensions (such as surface area, density, perimeter,
duration, and rate) are strictly controlled for, and their per-
formance reﬂects the use of similar analog representations of
number to those of adulthumans (e.g., Fetterman and MacEwen,
1989; Brannon and Terrace, 1998, 2000; Emmerton, 1998). These
animals can also be trained to press a lever a speciﬁc number of
times (ﬁxed-ratio schedules), and appear sensitive to the rate of
reinforcement (rate is deﬁned as number divided bytime)—there
is also evidence that certain animals can perform simple arith-
metic reasoning (addition, subtraction; see Gallistel and Gelman,
2000 for a fuller discussion).
MODE-CONTROL MODEL OF MECK AND CHURCH (1983)
The mode-control model of counting and timing (see Figure1;
Meck and Church, 1983) wasdeveloped to account for such ﬁnd-
ings, and provides a uniﬁed theory of numerosity and timing by
positing the existence of a functioning isomorphism (formal cor-
respondence) between number and duration. Itassumes a similar
functional network operates to process either time or number
(see; Meck et al., 1985; Church and Broadbent, 1990; Meck, 1997;
Carey, 1998, 2001; Gelman and Cordes, 2001; Nieder et al., 2002;
Nieder and Miller, 2003, 2004a,b; Pessoa and Desimone, 2003).
In this account, “pulses” are accumulated (or integrated) to pro-
vide a given estimate of magnitude, and this is then compared
to some stored (or remembered) criterion tally (of a given dura-
tion or number). Rats show similarities in their discrimination
of continuous (time) or segmented (number) signals such that
1-s segmented signal is equivalent to 200ms of continuous sig-
nal (this has been referred to as a “quantal unit”; Meck et al.,
1985). This type of organization (in particular, the required com-
parison between current and stored magnitude estimates) may
also facilitate arithmetic processing of basic time and number
magnitudes (see Gallistel and Gelman, 2000), as an alternative to
cross-dimensional statistical learningprocess thatareproposedin
ATOM (Walsh, 2003).
The way the integration mechanism is applied in the model is
that at the onset of a relevant stimulus pulses are directed into an
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FIGURE 1 | The information-processing “mode-control” model of timing
and counting. A pacemaker emits pulses which are gated into an
accumulator; it is a counter if operating in the event mode, and a clock
if operating in the run mode (see text for details). The current
accumulator value can be held in working memory and compared to a
previous accumulator value stored in reference memory. A decision
process determines the appropriate response [adapted from Meck and
Church (1983)].
accumulator by a “mode switch” that allows pulses to ﬂow (into
the accumulator) in one of three different modes (run and stop
modes for time, and an event mode for number) depending on
the nature of the stimulus (see, Church and Meck, 1984; Meck
et al.,1985; Broadbentetal.,1993; Meck,1997).There is nomode
nor accumulation process detailing the comparable process for
space (although this is not to say the model might not be able
to be adapted to do so). “An animal may be said to be timing if
the duration of an event serves as a discriminative stimulus; an
animal may be said to be counting if the number of events serves
as a discriminative stimulus” (Meck and Church, 1983: 320).
A word of caution should be given here to the term “count-
ing.” As it relates to the mode-control model, “counting” refers to
non-symbolic numerosity accumulation.In the humanliterature,
“counting” typically refers to related symbolic number represen-
tations (and related cognitive processes; e.g., Wynn, 1990). We
shall highlight the development of symbolic counting abilities in
children later.
EVENT MODE
The magnitude estimation of number occurs in the event mode,
when the mode-control model is assumed to be a model of
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(non-symbolic) counting. In this mode, discrete numerosities are
represented by the linear magnitude of a “batch” of pulses from
a pacemaker accumulated upon stimulus onset. (Borrowing the
analogy of Gallistel and Gelman, 2000; akin to adding a discrete
cupful of liquid to a container all at once; n.b. in the experiments
by Meck and Church, 1983,1985,number wassignaled bya series
of pulses).
RUN MODE
The magnitude estimation of time occurs in run mode. In the
model time is represented as the linear magnitude of pacemaker
pulses that are accumulated over the course of stimulus dura-
tion. (Akin to pouring liquid in from a continuous free-ﬂowing
source).
TEMPORAL INTEGRATION
Represents the numerosity of events or objects collected in the
accumulator (a total tally) and thus constitutes this model’s pro-
posed numeron, just as this same temporal integration process
represents duration when pulses are gated through the switch in
the run mode. (Akin to the scale on the container measuring how
much liquid it contains; see Gallistel and Gelman, 2000).
A further point to note, is that according to mode-control
models, if timing pulses are counted when a “neural network”
is running (i.e., the ON signal is true) then percentage of time
the “neural network” is in use can be calculated by comparing
the total count with the elapsed time. This calculation is sim-
ple even though the “neural network” may start and stop many
times duringthe monitoring. Inorderto dothis, the counter must
have a switch input, as well as its normal count input. You con-
n e c tt h en e u r a ln e t w o r k ’ sO Ns i g n a lt ot h es w i t c ha n das o u r c eo f
clockpulsestothenormalcountinput,makingthemeasurements
within the counter.
FOUR PHYLOGENIC SIMILARITIES IN TIME AND
NUMBER SENSE THAT THE MODE-CONTROL MODEL
CAN ACCOUNT FOR
Themode-control model is successful as itcanaccommodatefour
fundamental phylogenic (and ontogenetic) similarities common
tobothtime andnumbersense (e.g.,Mecketal.,1985;Fetterman,
1993; Roberts, 1995, 2002; Roberts et al., 1995, 2000; Roberts and
Boisvert, 1998), which we shall outline. Another strength of this
model (see also, Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984) is that the
shape of obtained time and number psychophysical discrimina-
tionfunctions correspondto functioning ofthe variousaspects of
the model (Figure1;s e eAllman and Meck, 2012 for a fuller dis-
cussion), and these types of indices are informative with respect
tothetypicalandatypicaldevelopmentofNEUTIN.Forexample,
on a bisection task (where two “anchor” exemplars are trained,
and intermediates are classiﬁed) non-humans and humans reveal
a subjective mid-point between the geometric and arithmetic
mean of the “anchor” (smallest and largest) stimuli (durations,
numerosities, line length; see, Church and Deluty, 1977; Meck,
1983; Allan and Gibbon, 1991; Wearden, 1991; Wearden and
Ferrara, 1995, 1996; McCormack et al., 1999; Melgire et al., 2005;
Droit-Volet et al., 2008; Penney et al., 2008; Kopec and Brody,
2010).
1. Both time and number transfer to novel stimuli, and oper-
ate simultaneously in a similar manner. Rats trained to press
one lever in response to a “short,” 2-s, 2-pulse tone sequence
and another lever in response to a “long” 8-s, 8-pulse tone
sequence reveal they have represented both time and num-
ber properties of these compound stimuli (second/pulse).
For instance, rats’ will continue to use the “short” response
when presented with a novel 4-s, 2-pulse sequence and use
the “long” response for a novel 4-s, 8-pulse tone sequence.
Similarly,theywillrespond “short”inresponseto anew 2-s,4-
pulse sequence and “long” to a new 8-s, 4-pulse sequence. In
other words, there appears a correspondence and “meaning”
to their nature (Meck and Church, 1983).
2. Magnitude estimations of time and number are transferable
to an equivalent extent, such that the contents of an accu-
mulator in the “event” (count) mode can be compared to a
stored value in “run” (time) mode. Timing and counting in
rats also transfers to a similar extent between different stim-
ulus modalities (i.e., auditory to cutaneous) suggesting that
amodal estimates of time and number can be extracted from
m a n yt y p e so fe v e n t s( Meck and Church, 1983).
3. Certainpharmacologicalagents;particularlythosethatmodu-
late dopaminergic, glutamatergic and cholinergic systems, can
inﬂuence time and number estimations in equivalent ways.
The produced magnitude estimate is modulated in a dose-
dependent manner by administration of indirect dopamine
agonists such as amphetamine and cocaine, which produces
an overestimation of both duration and number. Dopamine
antagonists (e.g., haloperidol) have the opposite effect, effec-
tively producing an underestimation of time and number
(e.g., Meck, 1983, 1996; Meck and Church, 1987; Meck and
Williams, 1997; Matell et al., 2004, 2006; Lustig and Meck,
2005; Cheng et al., 2006, 2008).
4. Time and number have identical discriminability and appear
bound to the scalar property. For instance, rats reveal
equivalent sensitivity to a proportional 4:1 ratio of counts
and times (Meck and Church, 1983). This reﬂects the
use of analog mental representations that obey the psy-
chophysical tenets of Weber’s law, found in other forms
of perception (Moyer and Landauer, 1967; Buckley and
Gilman, 1974). “The ‘scalar property’ refers to the fact
that the variance (or ‘noisiness’) of a cardinal memory
magnitude representation is proportional to the objective
magnitude (bigger = noisier). When mental magnitudes
have scalar variability, the discriminability of values obeys
Weber’s law, because the degree of overlap between repre-
sentations remains constant when the ratio of the means
is held constant. Thus the amount by which two scalar
quantities must differ in order to meet a constant crite-
rion of discriminability is proportional to their magnitude”
(Weber’s law; Whalen et al., 1999:130). Thus “the over-
lap between two [magnitude] distributions with scalar vari-
ability is determined by the ratio of their means” (Cordes
et al., 2001:698). The mode-control model accommodates
the scalar property at the level of memory distribution
(rather than through variance in the pulse accumulation
process).
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NON-SYMBOLIC “SENSE” OF NUMBER AND TIME
The mode control model is speciﬁcally designed to explain time
and number magnitude estimates in animals (see Meck and
Church, 1983; Meck et al., 1985), but may provide a useful frame
of reference for understanding the development of non-symbolic
counting and timing processes in non-verbal infants, young chil-
dren, and adults (e.g., Gallistel and Gelman, 1992; Wynn, 1992,
1995, 1996, 1998; Broadbent et al., 1993; Roberts and Mitchell,
1994; Roberts, 1995; Meck, 1997; Breukelaar and Dalrymple-
Alford, 1998; Wynn and Chiang, 1998; Dehaene et al., 1999; Xu
and Spelke, 2000; Spelke, 2000; Wynn et al., 2002; Brannon and
Roitman, 2003; Xu, 2003; Cordes et al., 2007).
IN INFANCY
Evidence of a primitive time and number sense in early devel-
opment includes reports that very young infants (and in some
cases, newborns) can discriminate small numbers of syllables
and tones (Bijeljac-Babic et al., 1993; van Marle and Wynn,
2006),simpledots(StarkeyandCooper,1980;Antell andKeating,
1983), moving objects and collections of objects (van Loosbroek
and Smitsman, 1990; Wynn et al., 2002), can enumerate het-
erogeneous arrays of objects as well homogeneous arrays (e.g.,
Strauss and Curtis, 1981; Feigenson, 2005), and can discrimi-
nate between numerosity with thesameprecisioninallmodalities
(Feigenson, 2007). Infants have also been shown to repre-
sent small numerical quantities across modalities (Jordan and
Brannon, 2006), and discriminate between large numerosities
(Lipton and Spelke, 2003). It even appears that “nuisance” task-
irrelevant sensory information may improve infants’ numerical
precision (Jordan et al., 2008). Infants also show interchange-
ability between numerosities of different dimensions such as
between two-or three drumbeats and two-or three objects, even
when duration is controlled for (Starkey et al., 1983; Kobayashi
et al., 2004; Feron et al., 2006; Izard et al., 2009). Collectively
these studies suggest that an innate form of abstraction exists
between different types of the same numerical magnitude
in early life.
As it relates to time sense, infants possess sensitivity to tem-
poral rhythm (Trehub and Thorpe, 1989)a n da r ea b l et os y n -
chronize and adapt their sucking behavior (and other forms of
motor activity) with the tempo of an external stimulus (Bobin-
Bègue et al., 2006). There is also evidence to suggest that infants
attend to the temporal features of stimuli in their environment
(Clifton, 1974; Jusczyk et al., 1983). For example, by 2 months of
age, infants are sensitive to the duration of sounds that differ by
less than 1-s (Jusczyk et al., 1983), and similar results have been
obtained for speech sounds (Eimas and Miller, 1980).
LourencoandLongo(2010)revealedthat9-month-old infants
can (bi-directionally) transfer learned associations (a map-
ping between stimulus color and relative magnitude) between
greater/lesser durations, size and numerosity. This points to a
(at least partly) shared general magnitude representation system,
and is consistent with both the mode-control model (although
it was not adapted for space) and ATOM. These ﬁndings reveal,
“representations of magnitude information are (at least partially)
abstracted from the speciﬁc dimensions” (Lourenco and Longo,
2010:873). They lean away from the mode-control model as
ﬁndings suggest, “the relation between number and time is only
o n et y p eo fa s s o c i a t i o ni nam o r eg e n e r a ls y s t e mo fm a g n i t u d e
representation” (Lourenco and Longo, 2010:79).
Perhaps the most striking support for the mode-control
approach is evidence from young infants that magnitude esti-
mates of time and number show scalar variability. Recall that in
the mode-control model, ratio dependency (a larger ratio dif-
ference is easier to discriminate) is explained due to (a decrease
in) the noisiness of stored time and number magnitude estima-
tions (i.e., their spread is reduced, so they overlap less). ATOM
acknowledges that the scalar property is a quality of multisensory
perception. Intriguingly, the scalar property is also a quality of
early social interactions for the infant (e.g., Stern and Gibbon,
1978; Jaffe et al., 2001). Like our other senses, it appears time
and number sense is based on ratio (rather than absolute) dif-
ferences (in magnitude). Furthermore, this appears to be honed
during the ﬁrst year of life (e.g., there are quantitative develop-
mental changes between 6- and 10-months of age in both time
and number sense). These ﬁndings endorse a common system of
magnitude representation between time and number (in the con-
text ofthemode-control model;ChurchandMeck,1983;Gallistel
and Gelman, 2000).
For instance, Xu and Spelke (2000)a sw e l la sXu et al. (2005)
report that 6-month-old infants can discriminate visual numeri-
cal arrays that differ by a 1:2 ratio (e.g., 8 vs. 16 dots) even when
contour length (density, surface area, etc) is controlled for, but
these infants do not discriminate visual arrays that differ by a 2:3
ratio (e.g., 16 vs. 24 dots). Although this pattern of results has
also been obtained when numerosity is signaled by sequences of
tones (which must be integrated across time, Lipton and Spelke,
2003), and actions (Wood and Spelke, 2005)ar e c e n ts t u d yi n
6-month olds has revealed numerical sensitivity to ratios includ-
ing 2:3, 1:3, 1:4, but only if tested under certain arrangements
(Libertus and Brannon, 2010). Moreover, individual differences
in preference for a numerically changing display are stable, and
the sensitivity to detect (ratio) numerical change at 6-months of
ageispredictiveofnumericalchangedetectionscoresat9-months
ofage(Libertus andBrannon, 2010). Cordes andBrannon(2009)
examined the ability of 7-month-old infants to compare small
and large number sets under a variety of ratio conditions (e.g.,
1:2 and 1:4), and report that small and large number sets could
both be discriminated given a fourfold, but not a twofold change
in number. In contrast, Wood and Spelke (2005)r e p o r tt h a t1 : 2
ratio dependence in 6-month olds holds for larger numbers of
actions (greaterthan 4),butnotforsmallnumbers ofactions(less
than 4). Weshall extend our discussion ofsmall vs. largenumbers
in a later section.
There are a handful of studies that have behaviorally assessed
duration discrimination thresholds in infants between 4- and 10-
months ofage (Brannon et al.,2004a, 2008; van Marleand Wynn,
2006; Provasi et al., 2011). For example, van Marle and Wynn
(2006) revealed 6-month-old infants can discriminate between
durations of 2- and 4-s, but not between 3-s and 4.5-s. That is to
say, typical 10-month-old infants can discriminate between dura-
tions (time) that differ according to a 1:2 ratio, as 6-month olds
can, in addition to a 2:3 ratio, which 6-month-old infants cannot
( a si st h ec a s ef o rn u m b e r ,s e eBrannon et al., 2007).
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Support for the idea that other dimensions (i.e., space) are
also represented as noisy magnitudes, and perhaps a shared rep-
resentational currency is provided by Brannon et al. (2006).
These authors report that 6-month infants reveal the same ratio-
dependency when discriminating size/area (i.e., 1:2, but not 2:3)
as for time and number. To-date, it is unknown whether preci-
sion for area similarly increases with age (e.g., by 10 months). In
addition, Möhring et al. (2012) revealed the same 1:2–2:3 ratio
improvements between infants 6- and 10-months of age when
discriminating different speeds (time/distance).
Given that psychophysical functions superimpose (with scalar
variability), it appears young infants possess similar subjective
sensitivity for different dimensions (i.e., time, number, area,
line-length, speed), which supports the idea that all quanti-
ties (continuous or not) are represented by analog magnitudes
with scalar variability, and the ability to represent magnitudes
improvesaccordingto a developmentaltrajectory set into motion
in early life.
IN CHILDHOOD
Sensitivity for time and number sense, perhaps not surprisingly,
continues to improve during childhood (we shall go on to discuss
ﬁndings as they relate to time and number in children sepa-
rately). For instance, Halberda and Feigenson (2008)r e v e a l e da
marked improvement in the performance of 3-and 6-old year-
old children during number discrimination from a 3:4 ratio
to 5:6 with increasing age (adults were as high as 10:11), and
between the ages of 5–7 years, children become able to discrimi-
nate number with increasing precision (e.g., see, Huntley-Fenner
and Cannon, 2000; Huntley-Fenner, 2001). Four-year-old chil-
drencanaccuratelyselect thevisualarrayofdotsthatcorresponds
numerically to a sequence of sounds while younger children can-
not(Mix et al.,1996).Siegler andBooth (2004)reportage-related
changes between 6 and 8 years of age in children’s represen-
tation of the “mental number line” (described in more detail
later). Speciﬁcally, younger children reveal logarithmic spacing
and older children linear spacing between numbers. Logarithmic
spacing (noise independent of magnitude) is inconsistent with
the scalar property (noise proportional to magnitude), and afore-
mentionednon-humanandinfantﬁndingsdemonstratingsimple
arithmetic reasoning (see Gibbon and Church, 1981; Brannon
et al., 2001).
D r o i t - V o l e te ta l .(2003) employed a bisection task with
5-and 8-year-old children (and adults), which required selective
attention to either time or number when they were both simulta-
neously presented (ignore one dimension). They report that for
younger children, number interferes with time, but time does
not interfere with number (an effect attenuated in older chil-
dren; but present in adults, Dormal et al., 2006). Droit-Volet and
colleagues subsequently examined time, number and line-length,
with number and line-length presented sequentially (through
time) and non-sequentially (Droit-Volet et al., 2008). During
non-sequential presentation, the obtained psychophysical func-
tions for number and line-length were comparablein both 5-and
8-year olds, but there was a relatively larger subjective mid-point,
and index of reduced sensitivity, for timing functions from all
children. Moreover,when number andline-length were presented
sequentially, these dimensional differences disappeared. They
interpreted their results in the context ofthe mode-control model
and the pulse accumulation process for time, which is suited to
sequential magnitude estimation. They contend that this type
of processing demands attentional and working memory abili-
ties (and are themselves components of these models; Figure1)
and this system is “tapped into” during sequential presentation
of other dimensions (e.g., line-length, however the model is not
presently designed to accommodate such dimensions).
DEVELOPMENT OF TEMPORAL COMPETENCE IN CHILDHOOD
Correspondences between age-related changes in sensitivity to
different dimensions suggests that between the ages of 5- and
8-years old, sensitivity for time lags behind sensitivity for num-
ber (Droit-Volet et al., 2003); time appears to be a dimension
that younger children may ﬁnd less salient and less likely to
attend to (Gautier and Droit-Volet, 2002). In fact, it is his-
torically considered in developmental psychology (Piaget, 1946;
Fraisse, 1967; Ornstein, 1969) that children are not equipped
with temporal abilities; instead these derive from superior abil-
ities in the processing of other dimensions (e.g., speed, num-
ber; although studies highlighted in this review have since
rebutted this).
For instance, the timing functions obtained with 3-, 5- and
8-year-old children reveal (the scalar property, and) temporal
judgments become more precise across development, which may
be related to attentional and working memory function (see,
Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2001; McCormack et al., 2004; Rattat
and Droit-Volet, 2005; Wearden, 2005; Droit-Volet and Meck,
2007; Droit-Volet et al., 2007).
Theoretical and computer modeling (in the context of scalar
expectancy theory; Gibbon et al., 1984) of temporal magnitude
data from children, tends to support the notion that various
components of the mode-control model, particularly “reference
memory” and attention, undergo age-related changes (see Droit-
Volet and Wearden, 2001; Droit-Volet et al., 2001; Droit-Volet,
2002, 2003a,b). As such, the development of psychological vari-
ables closely associated with “timing ability” (e.g., attention,
memory), may also play a role in the development of timing per-
formance across childhood and old age (e.g., Lustig and Meck,
2001, 2011; Lustig et al., 2005). Modeling of the timing functions
from children (interpreted within the context ofscalarexpectancy
theory) has also suggested that younger children make more ran-
dom responses than older children (i.e., between 3- and 8-years
old; Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2001).
Recently, Zélanti and Droit-Volet (2011) revealed discrimi-
nations between relatively small temporal magnitudes are eas-
ier than larger ones, and there are age-related improvements
(between 5-and9-yearsofage),withtemporalsensitivity improv-
ing earlier for the short than for the long durations. Age-
related improvements for “shorter” durations were predictive of
the development of the span of short-term memory, whereas
improved competence for “longer” durations was related to the
development of attention and executive functions. However only
age, and no cognitive abilities, were found to predict individ-
ual differences in time discrimination between the shortest and
longest durations.
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It has also been reported the psychophysical timing functions
of children aged 3-, 5- and to a lesser extent 8- year olds, become
ﬂatter (less sensitive) when interval timing is either interrupted
or tested after a (e.g., 24-h) retention delay. Rattat and Droit-
Volet (2005) also reveal an interruption task tends to lengthen
the subjective magnitude estimation, particularly in 5-year olds,
which they attributed to stored representations of trained tempo-
ral magnitudes in memory. Furthermore, temporal estimations
in children are inﬂated if the stimulus is bigger or brighter
(Levin, 1977, 1979, 1982). This represents known properties of
the psychophysiological modulation of time perception in adults
(Gibbon et al., 1997; Buhusi and Meck, 2005). Children also tend
to overestimate time on perception tasks, and under-reproduce a
given duration, and their duration judgments are less stable (see
Block et al., 1999).
It has been proposed that children under the age of 8 years, do
not tend to spontaneously count while timing (Wilkening et al.,
1987), and Clément and Droit-Volet (2006) report that temporal
magnitude estimations of 5-year olds display the scalar property
in both counting and non-counting conditions, but by 8-years
and adulthood, counting during timing results in a violation
the scalar property (see also, Hinton and Rao, 2004). This ﬁnd-
ing can be explained according to the mode-control approach.
“Counting is a multistep process, with the number of steps pro-
portional to the numerosity counted. If there is some probability
of error (either skipping an item or counting it twice) at every
step, then the more steps there are, the greater the expected
accumulation of miscounts. The variability in counts from this
source should, however...grow in proportion to the square root
of the numerosity... discriminations should get relatively better
as numerosities increase. That is, the discrimination of 30 from
20 should be more accurate than the discrimination of 3 from 2,
contrary to Weber’s law” (Cordes et al., 2001:699).
Lustig and Meck (2011) demonstrated that 8-year-old chil-
dren (and younger and older adults), showed “typical” sensory
modality asymmetry for durations signaled by either “sights”
or “sounds.” Usually it is found that a magnitude estimation
for time can be inﬂuenced by the modality, such that a given
stimulus duration (i.e., 5-s) is perceived as a longer if it is sig-
naled by a sound rather than a light (Wearden et al., 1998;
Penney et al., 2000). It is assumed by the mode-control model
that the clock runs faster for auditory stimuli as they cap-
ture and hold attention relatively automatically—thus they are
more efﬁcient at holding the switch closed, allowing larger pulse
accumulations (see Figure1)—whereas attending to visual stim-
uli requires controlled attention (Meck, 1984). In addition, a
memory distribution (of a given duration) may be composed
of “mixed-modality” memories, such that there might be a
bias by skew of over-represented modality (see Chen and Yeh,
2009; Gu and Meck, 2011). Lustig and Meck (2011)r e p o r t
children tend to overestimate auditory stimuli compared to
adults (they are comparable for visual stimuli). “Auditory stimuli
are disadvantaged relative to visual stimuli in children’s long-
term memory and age-related declines in attention” (Lustig and
Meck, 2011:2). In a separate study, Droit-Volet et al. (2004)
report that 5-year olds have greater variability in their judg-
ments of visual stimuli than auditory ones, indicating improved
developmental temporal sensitivity for “sounds” rather than
“sights.”
It has also been reported that although 3-year-old children can
“time” an event, they have difﬁculty timing the duration between
events (Droit, 1994). Young children are also found to base their
ability to estimate duration through action (Droit, 1995)o ra n
external “ticking” clock (Droit, 1994), but this is reduced by
around age ﬁve, and they seem aware of temporal rules govern-
ing their behavior (Droit et al., 1990; Pouthas et al., 1990). It has
also been reported that 3-year olds produce more accurate tem-
poral magnitude estimates when they are asked to press harder
than press longer, and press for longer and harder when asked
to press harder. Droit-Volet and Rattat (1999) reveal ﬁve-and-a-
half-yearoldsareabletotransferatargetdurationacrossdifferent
actions, but 3 year-olds cannot, suggesting children do not dis-
sociate time from action, or develop abstract concepts of time,
until around 5 years of age. This is consistent with ATOM which
emphasizes a single magnitude system arose from the need for
action. According to Droit-Volet (1998) “children’s feeling that
something is resisting them through their action may be the ﬁrst
step toward the understanding of duration” (1998:247).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUMERICAL ABILITY AND
SYMBOLIC NUMBER ACROSS INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD
As has been discussed, there is much evidence to support the
idea that a primitive time and number sense (at least) is onto-
genetically “built in,” but there is much debate as to the form
this may playin numerical development. In fact, preverbalcount-
ing may be a precursor to verbal counting abilities, as the basic
number sense may provide the basis for the verbal system and
arithmetic computation (Gallistel and Gelman, 1992). There are
some comparative ﬁndings with non-humans to suggest that ani-
mals can learn to map symbolic Arabic digits (1–9) to objects and
appropriatelymakeuseofthisknowledgethroughsymboliclabel-
ing (e.g., see, Matsuzawa, 1985; Washburn and Rumbaugh, 1991;
Brannon and Terrace, 1998, 2000; Pepperberg, 2006). “A more
controversial question is whether there is ontogenetic continuity
innumericalcognition”(Brannon,2002:224).Weshallnowhigh-
light children’s development of counting and symbolic number
representation.
The mode-control approach has been inﬂuential in the debate
surrounding the foundations of numerical thinking and verbal
counting abilityduring humandevelopment (e.g.,Gallistel, 1990;
Starkey et al., 1990; Wynn, 1990; Gallistel and Gelman, 1992;
Dehaene et al., 1999; Grondin et al., 1999; Whalen et al., 1999;
Brannon et al., 2001). Instead of using the representational con-
vention whereby (symbolic) numbers are used to represent linear
magnitudes, the mode-control model supposes the nervous sys-
tem uses numerosity magnitudes to represent symbolic number.
Accordingly, numerate individuals are presumed to have learned
to map magnitudes of basic number sense to number words and
numerals (i.e., from non-symbolic to symbolic; see Gallistel and
Gelman, 2000). ATOM supposes, “when we later learn about
[symbolic] number, the scaling mechanisms used for [all contin-
uous] dimensions with action-relevant magnitude information
will be co-opted in development for the scaling of [symbolic
discrete] number” (Bueti and Walsh, 2009:1836).
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IN INFANCY
Although the aforementioned ﬁndings support the notion that
the ability to represent and compare numerosity appears early in
development, other studies suggest that infants attend to contin-
uous spatial dimensions such as surface area and contour length
rather than number per se (Clearﬁeld and Mix, 1999; Feigenson
et al., 2002), challenging the notion that numerical represen-
tation is present in infancy (see, Mix et al., 2002; Newcombe,
2002). An alternative view is numerical competence in infancy
is the product of an automated system for tracking and reason-
ing about small numbers of (non-numerical) “object ﬁles” or
object-tracking mechanisms (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1992; Trick
andPylyshyn, 1994).Bythisformofaccount,object-ﬁle represen-
tations (rather than analog magnitudes) form the foundation of
the verbal counting system (see, Carey, 1998, 2001; Spelke, 2000;
Le Corre and Carey, 2007, 2008).
In support of this view, Feigenson et al. (2002)r e p o r tt h a t
10- and 12-month-old infants use object-ﬁle (size) rather than
numerical ratio to track sequentially hidden objects, as they can
compare representations of objects, and make ordinal “more” or
“less” judgments—but only when the magnitudes were relatively
small and within the limits (of about four items) of the “object-
ﬁle” system (i.e., 1 vs. 2, or 2 vs. 3; but not 4 vs. 6). However
Brannon (2002) has revealed that the ability to make ordinal
number judgments develops between 9- and 11-months of age,
even for numerosities that exceed the bounds of the object-ﬁle
system (see also Dehaene and Changeux, 1993). Discrepancies
between small and large numerosities may also reﬂect different
conditions that direct young infants attention to number (Xu,
2003; Feigenson et al., 2004; Wood and Spelke, 2005).
T h e“ m a g i cn u m b e rf o u r ”h a sb e e nt a k e na se v i d e n c et h a t
infants ability to numerate small numbers is related to “subitiz-
ing” (Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994), and that symbolic (verbal)
representations of number provide the basis for developing a
(non-symbolic) understanding of numerosity (rather than the
other way around, as supposed by the mode-control model).
Of course, this type of account is at odds with aforementioned
ﬁndings that infants can discriminate between large numerosi-
ties (with a large ratio difference), and can successfully reason
aboutthe“magicaldisappearance”ofalargenumber(speciﬁcally,
a collection) of objects (Chiang and Wynn, 2000).
Essentially, the dichotomy between small and larger numbers
speaks to the issue of whether they are represented by the same
or different cognitive system (see Buhusi and Cordes, 2011; Hyde,
2011), and was ﬁrst addressed by Jevons (1871): are numerosi-
ties less than the “magic number four” processed as individual
entities (subitizing, effectively ﬁlling in pockets of space), while
larger numbers are represented through the approximate number
system? (ANS; Feigenson et al., 2004). Alternatively, all magni-
tudes (small and large; as proposed by the mode-control model)
may be represented by a single system, such as ANS (Gallistel and
Gelman, 2000; Cordes et al., 2001; Cordes and Brannon, 2009),
with the accumulated magnitude representing a cardinal value.
However it has been cautioned that “accurate theories of numer-
ical cognition must take seriously the notion that, under many
conditions, small numbers are represented as arrays of numeri-
cally distinct individuals, not as sets with approximate cardinal
values” (Hyde and Spelke, 2012:13). Of course, if numerosities
below the “magic number” are integers rather than real-valued
magnitudes, they should violate scalar variability.
McCrink and Wynn (2004) examined infants’ numerical com-
putation explicitly using large numbers, and found that 9-month
olds appear to conduct arithmetic operations (addition and
subtraction) over estimates of numerical magnitude, further sup-
porting the idea that number sense supports numerical manipu-
lations and operations.
IN CHILDHOOD
A puzzling inconsistency is that infants are often purported to
possess numerical abilities that young children do not seem capa-
b l eo fw h e nt e s t e di ne x p l i c i tc h o i c ep a r a d i g m s( Huttenlocher
et al., 1994; Mix et al., 1996, 2002; Newcombe, 2002). For exam-
ple, Huttenlocher et al. (1994) showed that children younger than
3 years of age could not predict the numerical outcome of a
nonverbal addition and subtraction task. Four-year-old children
could accurately select the visual array of dots that corresponded
numerically to a sequence of sounds while younger children per-
formed at chance. These accounts of numerical development
suggest that children gradually develop the ability to form and
manipulate abstract representations of number.
Cantlon et al. (2010)r e p o r tt h a t3 - y e a r - o l dc h i l d r e na p p e a rt o
represent analog numerical magnitudes when enumerating sets
of objects, even those within the “magic number four” subitizing
range, and numerical judgments were inﬂuenced by area. These
authors observed ratio-dependence (scalar variance) for num-
bers both within and beyond the “magic number four” subitizing
range. Young children in this study also appeared to preferentially
attend to number over area.
Piaget (1952) reports abstract knowledge of arithmetic
requiresconsiderablelearning(i.e.,is not“built-in”)anddoesnot
emerge until a child is between 4 and 7 years of age, but studies
have since revealed young children (between one-and-a-half-year
to four years of age) master number conversion (e.g., see Gelman
and Gallistel, 1978; Starkey, 1992), and preschool children pos-
sess an abstract representation of number and simple addition
(Brannon and Van de Walle, 2001; Barth et al., 2005).
Spelke (2000) attributes the acquisition of mathematical skills
to object knowledge (permanence through space and time)
and numerosity, and it has been asserted that children must
“possess a magnitude-based estimation system for representing
numerosities that also supports procedures for numerical com-
putation” (McCrink and Wynn, 2004:776). Despite the infamous
(debunked)“cleverHans”demonstrations—thehorsethatappar-
ently had mastered symbolic calculation—it has been revealed
in children at least, that basic number sense (and numerosity
estimation) is related to math ability and the development of
mathematical intelligence (e.g., Carey, 1998, 2001; Gallistel and
Gelman, 2000; Gelman and Gallistel, 2004).
Booth and Siegler (2006, 2008) report an association between
5-year-old children’s school math achievement and linear (as
opposed to logarithmic) sequencing of symbolic (Arabic) num-
bers along a spatial schematic number line—this suggests the
spatial arrangement of numerical representations affects math
abilities (Siegler and Ramani, 2009). The ability to quickly make
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ordinal comparisons between symbolic numbers also appears to
be related to arithmetic calculation in older children (6–10-year
olds; e.g., De Smedt et al., 2009).
Recently, Libertus et al. (2011a) reported that the acuity
(sensitivity) of preschoolers’ number sense was predictive of
school math ability, even prior to the onset of formal math-
ematics instruction, and controlling for age and verbal skills.
There are other studies that report stable individual differences in
school-based math ability (verbal counting, ordinal comparison,
arithmetic) in young children early into their formal educa-
tion (Jordan et al., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Collectively, these
studies provide evidence that a primitive number sense lays the
foundation for more advanced numerical abilities.
By3yearsofage,childrenappeartohavemasteryofsomeparts
of the one to ten count sequence (Wynn, 1992), and between the
ages of three-and-a-half and four and-a-half children are skilled
with the decade count order (10, 20, 30, etc; Fuson, 1992). Also,
behavioral response times reveal marked age-related changes and
improves between the ages of 2 and 7 years (Huntley-Fenner and
Cannon, 2000; Huntley-Fenner, 2001). By the age of 5 years, not
all children have developed the ability to link symbolic symbols
with non-symbolic quantities (Lipton and Spelke, 2005).
A related line of research examines how counting typi-
cally becomes related to determining numerosity (cardinal word
principle)—this may be related to one-to-one correspondence
between items and number tags (Gelman and Gallistel, 1978; Mix
et al., 2011). In other words, children need to learn how count,
b u ta l s ow h yw ec o u n t( a n dt h a tt h el a s tc o u n tr e p r e s e n t sam a g -
nitude estimate). The fact that small numerosities (<4) can be
determined without counting (“subitizing”) may be at the root
of developing this knowledge. The representation of the words
“one,” “two, “three, “four” is progressive, but for other number
words the child needs to understand the equivalence between the
orderofthe wordsin the counting listandthe successive numbers
that are related by the function “+1” (see Carey, 2004). In much
t h es a m ew a y ,t w o ,2 ,a n d￿￿ are equivalent in their “two-ness.”
Wynn (1990) revealed that children aged between 2- and
3-years old generalize counting such that they can count sounds,
actions and objects. This is informative as the number of objects
might be determined by counting them in any order, but actions
and sounds must be counted in a certain order (i.e., when they
occur). If asked “how many” after counting, children younger
than 3-years of age are unable to produce an estimation of mag-
nitude that corresponds to the last number counted, whereas
children older than 3-years can. Moreover, if required to “give-
a-number” (i.e., perform an action a certain number of times),
children over 3-years of age will count as they perform the task,
whereas younger children do not (they tend to give only one or
two; see also Zur and Gelman, 2004).
It has been postulated that acquiring symbolic language
enables children to become able to make conceptual inferences
(e.g., see Spelke, 2011), by allowing them to selectively attend
to relevant information (e.g., Sandhofer and Smith, 1999). This
has led some researchers to propose that the numerical con-
cepts demonstrated by infants are not obviously related to the
later numerical concepts exhibited by preschool children as they
begin to count verbally (Mix, 1999; Mix et al., 2002; Newcombe,
2002; Rousselle et al., 2004). In a study of how children judge
the numerical equivalence of arrays of objects, Mix (1999)f o u n d
that children gradually develop the ability to identify numerical
equivalence. Children between 3- and 4-years of age could recog-
nize numerical equivalence among homogeneous arraysin which
elementsweresimilartooneanother,butcouldnotreliablyrecog-
nize numerical equivalence among heterogeneous arrays, which
was only found in 5-year olds. The ability to identify numerical
equivalence for heterogeneous arrays was correlated with chil-
dren’s verbal counting ability, independent of age. Mix (1999)
argues that number words allow children to acquire abstract
number concepts, even within the context of a nonverbal match-
ingtask(seealsoMixetal.,1996)—children becomebetter ableto
ignore superﬁcial object features as they master the verbal count-
ing system because number words embody abstract numerical
categories. In other words, children gradually develop the abil-
ity to represent number as they acquire linguistic and symbolic
knowledge. Previous studies ofnumerical cognition that required
verbal identiﬁcation of the number of objects in an array have
obtained similar results (Von Gast, 1957; Siegel, 1974).
Since Piaget (1952) studies using the number conservation
task, it is well known that children before the age of 6 or 7 years
will judgethe number of counters in two parallel rows to be equal
ifthe countersarearrangedoppositeto each other(i.e., in one-to-
one correspondence), but a longer (or shorter) row (e.g., created
by spreading out/pushing together the counters) is consistently
judged to have more (or less counters, respectively; see also Mix
et al., 2011). In ATOM, Walsh (2003:486) points out “is perhaps
maladaptive for an infant brain not to use a common metric [for
different magnitudes] as it is difﬁcult for an olderchild to unbind
these three elements [time, space, and quantity],” and is highly
dependent upon the ability to learn associations between them.
MAGNITUDE ESTIMATION IN ADULTHOOD
As it relates to number (and time) sense, it is found in both non-
humans and adults, that the speed and accuracy of estimates
of magnitude can be inﬂuenced by distance and size effects
(see Rumbaugh et al., 1987; Washburn, 1994; Brannon and
Terrace, 2000; Brannon and Roitman, 2003). Of course, this
relates to ratio-dependence (the scalar property); the ability to
discriminate two numbers improves as the numerical distance
between them increases, and sensitivity worsens as numerical
size increases. These effects are obtained for both non-symbolic
and symbolic number. Typically it is observed that temporal
estimation in adults conforms to the scalar property, to both
short and large durations (for a review see, Meck, 2003; Buhusi
and Meck, 2005).
In a seminal paper, Moyer and Landauer (1967)r e p o r tt h a t
during a task of symbolic Arabic number discrimination, “deci-
sion time was an approximately linear inverse function of the
numerical distance between the two stimulus digits” (as for other
dimensions) and when describing the data, “a reasonable ﬁt is
of the same general class as those usually found to describe
...differencesbetweenphysicalquantitiessuchaspitchandline-
length” (Moyer and Landauer, 1967:1520).
When required to press a response key a certain number of
times, there is scalar variability of adults pressing for small and
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large numbers, both within and beyond the subitizing range,
however this effect is abolished when participants are asked
to verbally count their presses out loud (Cordes et al., 2001).
Whalen et al. (1999) report proportionality (scalar variability)
between the number of tapsgenerated following aspeciﬁc request
(i.e., 7–25).
As it pertains to the “two process” theories of number devel-
opment, Revkin et al. (2008) report disproportionately higher
sensitivity for numbers in the subitizing range (1–4) than for
larger numbers in adults (see also, Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994).
The authors reconcile the violation of Weber’s law by suggesting
“that in the small-number range, variables other than the ratio
between stimuli (possibly variables relating to spatial arrange-
ment or to other perceptual factors) boost number discriminabil-
ity” and this “seems hard to separate from the original subitizing
hypothesis” (Revkin et al., 2008:613). In adults, Dormal and
Pesenti (2007) found that space inﬂuences number judgments,
but number does not inﬂuence spatial judgments, and Roitman
et al. (2007) report “short/few” and “long/many” classiﬁcations
transfer between time and number, with improved sensitivity
for number. Temporal judgments can also be biased by spatial-
numerical associations of response code (SNARC-type) effects
(Dehaene, 1997). Human ﬁndings have revealed: greater Arabic
digits(Oliveri et al.,2008); larger stimuli (Xuanet al.,2007); visu-
alizedforwardsmotion (Vicarioet al.,2007); visuomotor shifts to
the right (Frassinetti et al., 2009) and greater distances (DeLong,
1981; Sarrazin et al., 2004) are associated with longer estimated
durations (see also, Nicholls et al., 2011b). Secondary tasks tend
to disrupt temporal magnitude estimates, but only mental arith-
metic is impaired by a temporal task (Brown, 1997). It has also
been recently reported that adults’ ability to estimate time is
somewhat predictive of their mathematical intelligence (Kramer
et al., 2011).
Numerical magnitudes (i.e., 1–10) appear spatially organized
from left to right, and this phenomenon is referred to as the
mental number line (see de Hevia et al., 2008), and is believed
to correspond to the orienting of visual attention. It has been
considered that the mere presentation of symbolic digits can
impose a spatial attentional bias (i.e., left for a small num-
ber), and this shift modulates time judgments (Oliveri et al.,
2008). It has been recently reported that it is the process of
comparing size differences between numerical cues, rather than
the size of the number itself, which appears to bias time esti-
mation (Vicario, 2011). The subjective mid-point during num-
ber bisection has also been found to vary as a function of
spatial attention to the mental number line, i.e., presenting stim-
u l ii nn e a ra n df a rs p a c e( Longo and Lourenco, 2010), turn-
ing one’s head to the left or right also modulates (smaller or
larger, respectively) random number generation (Loetscher et al.,
2008), and the left and hand rights respond faster (during an
odd/even number discrimination) to smaller and larger num-
bers (respectively, Dehaene et al., 1993). Space and number
effects are also found when there is no lateralized (left/right)
response (Casarotti et al., 2007) or if events are presented in an
orthogonal arrangement (Nicholls et al., 2008;s e ea l s oNicholls
et al., 2011a). It is not beyond the scope of possibility that
(SNARC-type) spatial mappings might be related to a cultural
bias (i.e., in the Western world) to read across (and scale) from
left to right, and the correspondence to left-lateralized language
systems.
It has been suggested that spontaneous cross-modal inter-
action effects might not be as profuse in adulthood as during
infancy and childhood (see Walsh, 2003; Izard et al., 2009)—it
might make developmental sense to be equipped with a general
magnitude estimator to facilitate comparing functionally equiv-
alent co-varying quantities (e.g., to learn relations between size,
weightandlength). Any sucheffects arealsotakenassupportfora
general magnitude system, one in which unidirectional asymme-
tries exist between different dimensions. However, it is important
to note that stimulus magnitude effects (intensity, size, number,
emotional valence) are precisely known to bias interval time per-
ception, and pulse accumulation, and so caution should be taken
before attributing them to amoregeneralizedprocess.This ispar-
ticularly important from a developmental perspective, when the
attempt is essentially to establish “which comes ﬁrst?” (see also,
Ansari, 2008).
DIFFERENCES IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
Various ﬁndings examining the relative development of time and
number sense in pediatric developmental disorder populations
have emerged. These may shed light on some of the questions
surrounding the typical development of NEUTIN. For instance,
Spaepen et al. (2011) report that deaf individuals (who live in a
remote Nicaraguanculture)who lacka languagefornumber (i.e.,
no sign language) employ gestures to represent number, but have
markedly reduced accuracy in “how many” and “give a number”
type tasks for large numerosities (i.e., over three).
DEVELOPMENTAL DYSCALCULIA
Problems with mathematics may readily present in educational
environments with academicdemands,andthus (at-risk) school-
aged children may be identiﬁed as having mathematics disorder
or developmentaldyscalculia. This is one ofthe most well deﬁned
disabilities as it may thus relate to number sense. This is a dis-
order of numerical competence and arithmetical skill, such as
retrieval of antithetic facts and dependence on ﬁnger count-
ing when attempting number problems, in children of normal
intelligence with no neurological injuries (see Temple, 1992).
Children who experience difﬁculties with mathematics reveal
differences on number-comparison tasks with both symbolic
and non-symbolic stimuli. This may suggest problems linking
symbolic and approximate, to non-symbolic numerical represen-
tations. For example, Rousselle and Noël (2007)t e s t e dn u m b e r
magnitude estimates in children with mathematic learning dis-
abilities.TheyreportimpairmentsinArabicnumbercomparison,
number writing and trans-coding of tokens into Arabic numerals
(symbolic number), but intact abilities for addition and sub-
traction (non-symbolic number). Furthermore, those with math-
ematical disability revealed a propensity to represent number
magnitude over physical size (on a Stroop task), and they report
a larger numerical distance effect. Ashkenazi et al. (2009)r e p o r t
a larger numerical distance and size effects for double-digit num-
bers,andinterprettheirﬁndings todifﬁculties withsubitizingand
counting in this population (see Henik et al., 2011).
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Ashkenazi and Henik (2010) administered a physical line and
symbolic number bisection taskt oa d u l t sw i t hd e v e l o p m e n t a l
dyscalculia,andrevealedaffected individualsshowa greater(than
typical) tendency to underestimate the subjective mid-point (and
reveal anabsence of a typical biasfor line bisection). They discuss
theirﬁndings withinthecontextofdifferencesinthedevelopment
of the mental number line, and an over-reliance on logarithmic
(rather than linear) spacing (see also Geary et al., 2007).
Collectively, these ﬁndings were taken as evidence that chil-
dren with mathematics disabilities do have a basic number sense
(numerosity) but may experience problems relating numerical
magnitudes to symbols (see alsoLanderletal.,2004;Butterworth,
2010).
WILLIAMS AND DOWN SYNDROME
Ithas been revealed thatyoung children (around3 years old) with
Williams syndrome(WS)areableto enumerate small numbers in
dot arrays, but only when they differ by the 1:2 but not 2:3 ratio-
requirement (Van Herwegen et al., 2008). O’Hearn et al. (2011)
examined individuals with WS on a visual counting task, and
asked them “how many?” (cardinality principle) with a rapidly
presented array of dots. Those with WS revealed comparatively
normal performance in the counting task, but were only able to
(rapidly) accurately enumerate a (comparatively) smaller magni-
tude, even when arrays were presented for a longer period. These
ﬁndings were taken as evidence for a limited subitizing system in
WS (i.e., a “magic number three”). Ansari et al. (2005)r e p o r t e d
the ability of children with WS to understand cardinality was pre-
dicted by their verbal language scores. That is, affected children
may use language(rather than visuo-spatialskills, as is typical) to
develop the cardinality principle (for a review, see O’Hearn and
Luna, 2009). It has also been reported that individuals with WS
mayexperience speciﬁc difﬁculties with the“mental numberline”
(number-space interaction effects) as they are less accurate on
tasks such as “is ﬁve closer to nine or six?” (O’Hearn and Landau,
2007;s e ea l s o ,Krajcsi et al., 2009).
In an attempt to examine whether numerosity relies upon
approximateestimatesofmagnitude(visuo-spatial)andsymbolic
number upon verbally mediated language processes, Paterson
et al. (2006) made direct comparisons between WS (charac-
teristically aspects of language are spared, but spatial abilities
are impaired) and Down syndrome (DS; spatial spared, aspects
of language impaired). On a task displaying small numbers of
objects, theyreportinfants with DSareimpairedintheir abilityto
discriminate small numerosities, but infants with WS are not. On
a non-symbolic numerical distance task (using dot arrays) with
affected older children and adults, they report those with WS do
not reveal an expected distance effect, but those with DS do, sug-
gestiveofimpairedanalognumericalmagnituderepresentationin
W S( b u tn o tD S ) .T h e ya l s or e p o r tW Si m p a i r m e n t so nav a r i e t y
of other tasks, particularly those that require mental manipula-
tion of numbers, such as putting them in order (rote counting
was generally in tact). This pattern was interpreted as a problem
linking non-symbolic and symbolic forms of number in WS.
ChildrenwithDownsyndromedisplaydifﬁculties oncounting
and cardinal number tests (i.e., reporting “how many”; Gelman
and Cohen, 1988), and may be less likely to notice violations
of counting principles (Porter, 1999). For example, Nye et al.
(2001) required children with DS to verbally count items in a set,
and select a certain number of items (i.e., cardinality). Children
with DS produced shorter count sequences and could count
smaller sets. Camos (2009) required children with DS to enumer-
ate large numerosities (dot arrays) that they were able to do with
a 1:2 ratio, but not a 2:3 ratio (comparison participants showed
age-related ratio improvements).
ADHD AND AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER
It has been reported (Zentall et al., 1994) that children with
attentiondeﬁcithyperactivity disorder(ADHD)reveallower(and
slower) problem solving for math concepts on timed arithmetic
tests, and the authors attributed these ﬁndings to difﬁculties
with spatio-temporal organization. Kaufmann and Neurk, 2008
(see also 2006) tested 9- to 12-year-old children with ADHD
on a variety of number tasks, including; placing an Arabic digit
on an analogue scale, number discrimination at a range of dis-
tances, counting, non-symbolic (dot) enumeration (so-called
“core” number abilities) and simple and complex mental and
written calculation; and report particular difﬁculties with the
ﬁ r s tt w oi nc h i l d r e nw i t hA D H D ,p a r t i c u l a r l yw h e nn u m e r i -
cal distance is small (the remainder were not affected). There
is a variety of evidence to suggest individuals with ADHD also
experience pathophysiological differences in temporal processing
(see Barkley et al., 1997; Gooch et al., 2011; Allman and Meck,
2012). For instance, Valko et al. (2010) report impairments on
reproduced temporal magnitude estimates (in the supra-seconds
range) and temporal discrimination (in the sub-seconds range),
andage-related changesbetween children andadultswith ADHD.
The question of whether there is disordered processing of the
temporal quality of information in autism spectrum disorder,
and the extent to which this may impact the autistic behav-
ioral phenotype, is beginning to be studied (Allman, 2011; Falter
and Noreika, 2011), but has much anecdotal and clinical sup-
port. Although in their infancy, there are at least some empirical
grounds (see also Szelag et al., 2004; Martin et al., 2009; Allman
et al., 2011; Kwakye et al., 2011;b u ts e eWallace and Happé, 2008;
Jones et al., 2009a) and published commentaries supporting the
temporal deﬁcit hypothesis of autism (Boucher, 2001; Wimpory,
2002; Allman and DeLeon, 2009; Allman, 2011).
For example, Allman et al. (2011) report the timing func-
tions across a wide age range (7–17 years) of affected individuals,
and reveal (using a bisection task) potentially characteristic dif-
ferences in the location of the subjective mid-point—which is
found to be somewhat predictive of diagnostic communication
and working memory impairment for shorter durations. They
alsorevealpoorer temporalsensitivity forlongerdurations.These
authors make modeling comparisons with previous reports from
typically developing children (Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2001)
and report that those with autism spectrum disorder appear to
have more variable temporal memories, to an extent comparable
with typically developing 5 year olds; and were likely to truncate
(shorten) the “anchor” durations, to an extent that was compara-
blewithtypicallydeveloping3yearolds.This lendssupporttothe
claim that time sense may be developmentally delayed in affected
individuals, and may even contribute to diagnostic symptoms.
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Assuming this is indeed the case in autism spectrum disor-
der, it might be conjectured that there may be relative differ-
ences and/or insensitivities in the “run” and “event” modes in
the magnitude accumulation system (in a mode-control model).
Presumably, given the shared mechanism but different mode of
representation between basic time andnumber estimation, afault
operating in one mode (i.e., run) might produce a compensatory
over-reliance upon using the other mode (i.e., event). Of course,
we might also expect both time and number sense to be impaired
ifthere arecentral problemsin the function ofthe integration sys-
tem, or if magnitude estimation is a more “generalized” process
(i.e., ATOM).
If an atypically developing child ﬁnds it difﬁcult to make
sense of events according to their temporal properties, an adap-
tive strategy might be to use their numerical (or other stimulus)
properties instead. As it pertains to oddities with number, it is
common for children with autism spectrum disorder to have pre-
occupations for symbolic numbers; assigning numbers as labels
for objects, events and animate beings; knowing how many parts
there are to objects or events, and their order or calendrical
quality. To-date it is unknown whether there is preserved num-
ber sense (i.e., ANS) and typical magnitude interaction effects
(i.e., “mental number line”) in this disorder, and like Williams
syndrome, perhaps these individuals “over” rely upon rote for-
mal instruction, and symbolic numerical processing (although
individuals may also have language problems, unlike in WS).
Although not characteristic of the disorder per se,f o rar e v i e w
of mathematical ability in autism spectrum disorders see Chiang
and Lin (2007)a n dJones et al. (2009b).
Intriguingly with respect to posited deﬁcits in temporal pro-
cessing in autism spectrum disorder, and an compensation on
symbolic number (or other dimensions), it is not uncommon
for affected individuals to have unusual interests in timetables,
calendars, and routines, which might serve as useful “external”
temporal supports (e.g., Lalli et al., 1994). There is evidence
that children and teenagers with autism spectrum disorder reveal
impairments in higher-order temporal cognition (Boucher et al.,
2007), including the ability to 1) think about past or future
changes of think about a current situation; 2) understand that
entities change over time but are still the same thing; 3) compre-
hend that successive events are part of a unitary process, which is
not attributable to non-temporal cognitive factors such as inabil-
ities with inferencing or generativity, motivation or attention.
Parents of children with autism spectrum disorder (like parents
of children with attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder) tend to
describe them as having a “poor” sense of time (Barkley et al.,
1997; Allman et al., 2011). At face value, these studies endorse a
developmental association between a basic time sense and higher
concepts and adaptability to time.
It is curious to wonder whether differences with time (and
number) are somehow related to the outstanding skills ofsavants,
which fall into ﬁve categories; mathematics (human calculator),
calendarcalculatingandmusic(external representations oftime),
art and mechanical or spatial skills; particularly as these relate to
different analog modes of stimulus representation (i.e., number,
time, and length; see Droit-Volet et al., 2008;a l s oGonzález-
Garrido et al., 2002; Thioux et al., 2006).
NEUROSCIENCE OF TIME AND NUMBER ABILITY (NEUTIN)
Although researchers have identiﬁed particular brain areas that
function as neural integrators, and thus would likely serve good
candidates for the supposed pulse accumulation process (of the
type described by the mode-control model), a full explanation of
how neurons integrate time and number is still lacking (Matell
et al., 2003, 2011; Matell and Meck, 2004; Meck, 2006a,b; Meck
et al., 2008; Coull et al., 2011). As it relates to making magni-
tude estimates, the basal ganglia, prefrontal cortex and inferior
and posterior parietal cortex are usually recruited on tasks exam-
ining number and time magnitude estimation (Breukelaar and
Dalrymple-Alford, 1999; Casini and Ivry, 1999; Rao et al., 2001;
Macar et al., 2002; Hinton et al., 2004; Buhusi and Meck, 2005;
Pouthas et al., 2005; Jahanshahi et al., 2006) and these ﬁndings
tend to support comparative ﬁndings from animals (Schubotz
et al., 2000; Schubotz and von Cramon, 2001). Although, as we
have highlighted, there is much support for the idea that magni-
tudes of different dimensions (at least partly) share a common
basis, they can be dissociated in adults with left-and right lat-
eralized parietal lesions, who reveal selective impairments with
number and time. For instance Cappelletti et al. (2011)r e p o r ta
patient with left lesion displayed otherwise intact temporal pro-
cessing that was inﬂuenced by irrelevant numbers, which them-
selves could not be adequately processed; and a patient with a
rightlesionrevealedimpairedtimeestimationthatcouldbemod-
ulated bypreservednumericalprocessing (neither patientshowed
numerical processing could be inﬂuenced by time). The same
patient withthe rightparietallesionhadpreviouslybeen reported
to show impaired temporal processing (a tendency to underesti-
mate duration), but intact spatial and numerical processing and
number-time interaction effects (i.e., small numbers perceived
as shorter, long numbers perceived as longer; Cappelletti et al.,
2009).
Evidence from electrophysiological recordings in animals
reveals neurons (single cells) with periodical ﬁring patterns, those
tuned to speciﬁc magnitudes, and neurons with monotonically
increasing ﬁring as a function of increases in magnitude, for both
time and number (e.g., see Nieder et al., 2002; Matell et al., 2003;
Nieder, 2004; Nieder and Miller, 2004b; Dehaene and Brannon,
2010). For instance, Nieder et al. (2002) revealed individual neu-
rons in monkey prefrontal cortex appear to code for speciﬁc
cardinal numerosities, and revealed size and distance effects (at
least partly accounted for by the mode-control model). It is also
revealed that neurons in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) are active
before those in prefrontal cortex, suggesting number might be
represented in the parietal cortex and sent to PFC for further
processing (e.g., number related responses). In monkeys trained
to perform a temporal comparison task, neurons in intraparietal
regions were tuned to the temporal durations of the comparison
stimuli (Leon and Shadlen, 2003).
ATOM (Walsh, 2003; Bueti and Walsh, 2009) supposes the
parietal cortex is the “seat” of the generalized magnitude sys-
tem, as this region is often recruited during spatial (Sereno et al.,
2001; Pinel et al., 2004), numerical (Dehaene et al., 1999; Piazza
et al.,2007)andt emporal(Maquetetal.,1996; Leon andShadlen,
2003) processing. This shared neural basis (parietal cortex) of
the representation of number (numerical value) and size (size of
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digits; see Dehaene et al., 2003; Fias et al., 2003; Pinel et al., 2004;
Kadosh et al., 2005) is undoubtedly reﬂected in behavioral simi-
larities between magnitude estimation judgments between time
and number, and other quantities (i.e., line length). It is often
found that number (with its symbolic connotations to language)
and number tasks that require calculation (held to use verbal
coding), involve left or bilateral parietal cortex, while time and
space activates the right parietal cortex. In other words, “dimen-
sions may have become lateralized from one another due to
their output—number requires verbal representations, and time
and space are more important for coordinating action” (Walsh,
2003:485). Cohen and Dehaene (1996) have suggested both (left
and right) inferior parietal cortices are necessary for analogue
magnitude representation.
As it relates to time sense, the striatal beat frequency (SBF)
model (Matell and Meck, 2004) is a neurobiological instantia-
tion of the pulse accumulator model of scalar expectancy theory
(Gibbon et al., 1984;s e eMeck et al., 2008; Coull et al., 2011).
Oscillatory neural inputs from the activity of large areas of cortex
constitute the time code, and patterns of oscillatory activity are
detected bystriatalmediumspinyneurons(inputcellsofthebasal
ganglia). The memory stage of the model (of the type described
by the mode-control model) is attributed to the adjustment of
cortico-striatal weights (which become “tuned”), and is assumed
to depend upon the same neural representation of a speciﬁc stim-
ulusasworking memory (see Lustig and Meck, 2005; Lustig et al.,
2005). From a computational perspective, it has recently been
proposed that “chains of integrators constructed from mecha-
nisms exhibiting a range of intrinsic time constraints (ranging
fromslowproteinsynthesistorapidlyrampingneuralﬁringrates)
may...perform interval timing” (Simen et al., 2011:1). In this
account, magnitude estimates of time (in the seconds-to-minutes
range) are mediated by chains of leaky accumulators.
IN INFANCY
Recall that time and number discrimination in infancy shows
ratio-dependent improvements between 6- and 10-months of age
(e.g., Brannon et al., 2007; Cordes and Brannon, 2009; Cantlon
et al., 2010). The same pattern of results has also been found in
electrophysiological recordings from infant brains. For instance,
Libertus et al. (2009) demonstrated 7-month-old infants are able
to detect novel numerosities (following habituation to a standard
number). The magnitude of the “spike” of the deviant-triggered
(“odd-ball”) amplitude produced in the brain to the unexpected
change in numerosity (or duration, to be discussed) constitutes
an event-related potential (ERP). These authors report that the
ERP varied in accordance to changes in number—speciﬁcally, the
greater the relative difference between numerosities (1:3 ratio vs.
1:2 ratio) ratherthan their absolutedifference, the bigger the ERP.
Additionally, Hyde and Spelke (2011) recorded ERP’s from 6- to
7.5-month-old infants and also obtained evidence that represen-
tation of large numerosities in infants are approximate and ratio-
dependent. Speciﬁcally, large numbers evoked a (mid-latency
parietal) ERP that was dependent upon stimulus numerosity,
whereas small numbers evoked an (occipital-temporal) ERP that
was dependent upon the cardinal value of stimuli (i.e., not ratio-
dependent). This ﬁnding was interpreted as support for the idea
that there might be different cognitive systems for small andlarge
numerosities.
In a recent study, Libertus et al. (2011b) observed that follow-
ing steady-state repetition ofthe same numerosity, a proportional
change in numerosity produced a proportion change in elec-
trophysiological entrainment (Weber’s law). Moreover, neural
entrainment predicted infants’ number discrimination measured
behaviorally2 months later.Hyde et al. (2010)showed the latency
of the ERP after a change in shape (space) occurred much later
(i.e., after 5–8s) compared to when number was changed (i.e.,
after 2–5s) in 6-month-old infants. Further, they report a right
lateralized response to number changes (see also Izard et al.,
2008).This isincontrasttoother reports thathavefoundbilateral
activity (Cantlon et al., 2006). As itmayrelate to the development
of a “two-part” number system and the “magic number four,”
HydeandSpelke(2011)reportthat6-montholdsdisplaypatterns
of electrical brain activity which follows the scalar property (i.e.,
the ERP scaled with the ratio between numbers), but only for the
processing of larger, but not smaller numbers (i.e., those in the
subitizing range).
In relation to time sense, Brannon et al. (2008)e m p l o y e d
a timing-interval oddball paradigm coupled with electrophysi-
ological recording in 10-month-old infants, and examined the
amplitude to an time-interval triggered (“odd-ball”) spike to
deviations in duration, comparing infants’ performance with a
group of adults. The peak magnitude of the ERP has been shown
to vary as a function of the standard to deviant ratio in both
infants and adults (1:2, 2:3: 1:3, and 1:4; Brannon et al., 2008).
Moreover, when ratio was held constant and absolute values were
made to vary, the ERP did not vary. That is, the “hallmark”
scalar property is also obtained in the ﬁring patterns of neurons
c o d i n gf o rt i m e( s e ea l s o ,Brannon et al., 2004b). Infants also
revealedaslightrightlateralizationintheERPfortimemagnitude
estimation.
IN CHILDHOOD
Electrophysiological studies in children suggest that number pro-
cessing in the inferior parietal cortex begins as a right-lateralized
process and the left hemisphere gradually takes over, while right-
lateralized activity does not show such age-related changes (e.g.,
Ansari and Dhital, 2006). More recently, Heine et al. (2011)s t u d -
ied elementary school children (around 7 years of age) on a non-
symbolic number discrimination task using a range of numerical
magnitudes, both within and beyond the subitizing range. They
report late parietal ERP’s that were proportionally affected by the
relative distance between the magnitudes, and which were more
right-thanleft-lateralized,includingthoseinthesubitizingrange.
Temple and Posner (1998)haveshownthatthebrainactivity asso-
ciated with symbolic number discrimination shows little change
between the age of 5-years and adulthood. They report that while
the reaction times for numerical comparisons of Arabic numerals
and dot arrays dropped threefold between 5 years and adult-
hood, the numerical distance ERP effects and the loci of activity
remained constant between children and adults. The consistency
in patterns of brain activity is impressive given that dramatic
changes in numerical language and skill occur between 5 and 20
years of age.
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It has been revealed through functional neuroimaging (fMRI)
that young children can discriminate between numerical val-
ues across different notation systems, both symbolic and non-
symbolic, and recruit the same parts of the brain as adults when
doing so (occipitio-temporal and parietal cortex), plus a few
regions more (inferior frontal; e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009). For
instance, Cantlon et al. (2006) tested non-symbolic and area dis-
crimination in 4-year olds, and revealed similar IPS activation to
number as in adults.
This approach also reveals age-related fronto-parietal shifts
in number processing, of basic and advanced numerical tasks
(Ansari and Dhital, 2006; Ansari, 2008; Holloway and Ansari,
2010). The decreasing involvement of prefrontal cortex is
assumed to reﬂect a developmental disengagement of domain-
general processes related to executive control and working mem-
ory (Ansari et al., 2005; Rivera et al., 2005). These ﬁndings can
be taken as support for the idea that a core neural system inte-
grates notation-independent numerical representations, and that
mental arithmetic may have functional specialization on the left
inferior parietal cortex.
Kaufmann et al. (2006, 2008) have reported neural overlap
between non-symbolic numerical and spatial processing in chil-
dren around 8 years old (using hand and ﬁnger stimuli). In
contrast to adults, children reveal increased activity in bilateral
supramarginal gyrus, post-and-precentral gyrus, and anterior-
lateral portions of the IPS. Cantlon et al. (2011) attempted to
measure activity to symbols (numbers and letters, and a variety
of other comparison stimuli), and compared to adults, children
revealcomparableleft-lateralizedmid-fusiform/inferiortemporal
gyrus activity for both letters and numbers.
As pertains to developmental disabilities, individuals with
developmental dyscalculia also present with presumed neuropsy-
chological damage to the IPS, thus providing additional support
for this neurological locus in numerical processing and abstract
number. It has been thought this disorder may characterize a
deﬁcit with the “mental number line” (Bachot et al., 2005)
or in the linking between non-symbolic magnitude and sym-
bolic notation (Rubinsten and Henik, 2005; Rousselle and Noël,
2007). Kaufmann et al. (2009)r e v e a lt h a td u r i n gn o n - s y m b o l i c
number processing, children with dyscalculia reveal stronger acti-
vations in the left inferior parietal cortex and reduced deacti-
vations in the right inferior parietal cortex, perhaps suggestive
of an impaired number sense and compensatory neural activity.
However, Mussolin et al. (2009) required affected children aged
9–11 years old to identify the larger numeral in a pair (with a
variety of numerical distances; i.e., 2 vs. 4; 2 vs. 8) and report
that affected children show absence of typical numerical distance
effect modulations of the IPS (as typical children do). They also
observed other differences between typical and dyscalculic chil-
dren: typically there is stronger right intraparietal sulcus (IPS;
and right middle frontal gyrus) activation for small than large
numerical distances, while children with dyscalculia show left
supramarginalgyrusandmiddlefrontalgyrusactivation; affected
children also revealed postcentral gyrus activation for number in
contrast to color comparison.
It has been revealed that older children (10–15 years) with
ADHD show decreased activation on a time discrimination task
contrasted by a temporal order task in right dorsolateral and
inferior frontal cortex, and right anterior cingulate into SMA
(Smith et al., 2008). There is unpublished fMRI data to suggest
that children with autism spectrum disorder reveal differences
in activity in cortico-cerebellar and cortico-striatal circuits when
timing relatively short (2-s) and longer (8-s) durations: children
with autism may recruit a “longer” timing system for shorter
durations (Allman et al., in preparation).
IN ADULTS
Electrophysiological recordings in adults have revealed the mag-
nitude of an ERP is proportional to the ratio of the difference
between temporal and numerical magnitudes (scalar property).
As it relates to time estimation, there has been much specula-
tion as to whether brain rhythms may serve as the “tick” of a
clock (Treisman, 1984). This includes alpha and theta rhythms,
and event-related de-synchronizations.Perhapsthe mostoft cited
is the slow negative wave called the contingent negative varia-
tion (CNV; for a discussion, see Pouthas, 2003). However it has
recently been suggested that rather than being directly implicated
intheaccumulationprocess,theCNVlikelyrepresentstime-based
decision and response processes (van Rijn et al., 2011).
Szucs and Soltesz (2007) were able to dissociate ERP’s associ-
ated with both facilitation and interference on the (number-size)
numerical Stroop paradigm (i.e., judge number magnitude with
physically smaller and bigger Arabic digits). “In a nutshell, in
the numerical task we found an ERP facilitation effect related
to perceptual processing” (Szucs and Soltesz, 2007:3196). They
also report that number had a slower processing speed than size,
and an ERP numerical distance effect which was stronger over
right (than left) parietal regions. The timing of the ERP was also
associated with distance effects, and occurred at the same time
as the Stroop facilitation effect, “suggesting the facilitation effect
appeared when numerical information was just being evaluated
or was already available...Most probably, the faster processed
irrelevant size information could prime and accelerate the pro-
cessing of the slower processed numerical information in the
common magnitude representation” system (Szucs and Soltesz,
2007:3197).
As it relates to numerical processing, Libertus et al. (2007)
employed non-symbolic (dots) and symbolic (Arabic digits;
1–10) numbers and required adults to judge whether the pre-
sented number was less/more than ﬁve. For symbolic numbers,
they report distance-related ERP modulation across parietal and
temporal-occipital regions, andgreater right-lateralized posterior
positive ERP’s for symbolic digits closer to the comparison (5;
than those further apart, e.g., 9), however this was not found
small non-symbolic number distances; and ERP’s increased as
numerosity increased (size effect). With a greater range of values
(8–30) they did obtain similar ERP distance effects as symbolic
digits (indicative of input-notation independence).
As it relates to the question of the “magic number four,” there
is evidencethatsmallandlargenumber processingcanbedissoci-
ated inadultsatthe electrophysiological levelwith respect toboth
pattern and time: small cardinal numbers (within the ‘subitizing’
range) invoke an early visuo-spatial attentional component, and
the ERP is largest for three objects, then two, then one; while
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larger numbers modulate a mid-latency component in the right
intraparietal region that is sensitive to ratios. In the same study,
Hyde and Spelke (2012) also report lateralization effects, and
identiﬁed several distinct loci, for small and large non-symbolic
numbers. The authors surmised a single system represents all
numerosities, but is constrained by cognitive processes related
to the limits of an early attentional selection processes; small
numbers (e.g., four objects) might be selected (by attentional
processing) as a group, but larger numbers likely require (more
demanding) parallel processing.
In a procedure combining electrophysiological and fMRI, it
has been shown that patterns of cortical activity are attributable
to theinputofsymbolic notation (verbalorArabic). Forinstance,
bilateral extrastriate cortices and a left-lateralized precentral
region are more activated during verbal (than Arabic) numbers,
while activity in right fusiform gyrus (the “expert” area), bilateral
inferior parietal and frontal regions is greater for Arabic (than
verbal) notation. Bilateral activation along the interparietal sul-
cus and precuneus that corresponds to numerical distance was
also noted (Pinel et al., 2001). This is consistent with a basic
notation-independent system ofmagnitude(see also,Piazzaetal.,
2007). Piazza et al. (2004) report the percent signal change of
IPS response to deviant numerosities increased with the dispar-
ity between the habituated and deviant numerosities. The general
conclusion of this study was that the IPS responds to changes in
the numerical quantity of a stimulus even when explicit com-
parison of stimuli is not required and regardless of whether the
stimuli involve Arabic numerals or dot arrays (but see, Shuman
and Kanwisher, 2004).
Using fMRI, Pinel et al. (2004) examined adults’ magnitude
estimation for size, luminance and number; and revealed at both
the behavioral and neural level, number interfered with size, but
not withluminance.Ithasalsobeen suggested that number-space
interactions (i.e., “mental number line”) might be mediated by
shared parietalcircuits forexternal attention to spaceandinternal
representations of number (Hubbard et al., 2005). For instance, it
has been reported that there is left-lateralized parietal activation
when participants’ attention is directed to time, right-lateralized
parietal activation when attending to space, and bilateral activa-
tion whenprocessingbothdimensions simultaneously(Coull and
Nobre, 1998), and patients with spatial neglect (i.e., damage to
right parietal cortex produces failure to attend or response to left
space) reveal a variety of timing deﬁcits (e.g., see Danckert et al.,
2007; Hoeckner et al., 2008; Calabria et al., 2011). For example,
Vuilleumier et al. (2004) report patients with neglect are slower
to classify numbers (Arabic) if they are smaller (than larger) than
a target number, which they attributed to difﬁculties spatially
representing numbers in the left side of the mental number line.
In adults, symbolic number processing (and complex math
ability) is usually characterized by bilateral, and in some
instances, left-lateralized IPS activity (for details, see Dehaene
et al., 2003; Santens et al., 2010). For instance, Piazza et al. (2002)
report the IPS is active when participants estimate numeros-
ity across non-symbolic numerical stimuli such as sets of visual
objects or auditory events, and Kadosh et al. (2005)r e p o r t
notation-independent activity in IPS between symbolic (dig-
its, number words) and non-symbolic number (dots; see also,
Naccache and Dehaene, 2001; Eger et al., 2003). Further, right-
lateralizedIPSactivation isgreaterwhenparticipantscomparethe
values of Arabic numerals (or numerosity, ANS) than when they
compare stimuli of other such semantic categories as animals,
body parts, or abstractsymbols alongcontinuous dimensions like
ferocity, relative position, and orientation (Le Clec’h et al., 2000).
Bilateral IPS is selectively activated when participants perform
approximatearithmetic calculationsonsymbolicnumericalstim-
uli such as Arabic numerals and number words (Pesenti et al.,
2000; Simon et al., 2004; for reviews see, Dehaene, 2003; Dehaene
et al., 2004). This activation is not related to factual knowledge of
arithmetic outcomes because greater IPS activation is also found
when participants roughly estimate the answers to arithmetic
problems. The activation can be dissociated from the patterns of
IPSactivation associatedwiththecalculationofprecisearithmetic
outcomes (Dehaene et al., 1999). For example, when participants
are presented with the problem “4 + 5,” the IPS is activated when
they choose the closest answer from the options “8 or 3” but the
IPS is not activated when they identify the answer precisely from
the choices “7 or 9.” IPS activation is found when participants
are asked to compute the outcomes of various addition and sub-
traction computationsbutnotwhenthey aresimplyaskedtoread
number words(e.g., Chochon etal.,1999).Thebilateralposterior
superior parietal lobe is believed to correspond to spatial atten-
tion along the “mental number line,” while the left angular gyrus
supports verbally learned facts (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4).
Pinel and Dehaene (2010) investigated whether individual dif-
ferences in functional asymmetry (left-lateralization) in areas
involved in sentence listening and reading are mirrored in the
asymmetry of areasinvolved in mental arithmetic, andfoundthis
to be the case. They report arithmetic processing recruits frontal,
parietalandsubcortical regions. “Speciﬁcally, the proﬁleof asym-
metry in the posterior superior temporal sulcus during sentence
processing co-varied with the asymmetry of calculation-induced
activation in the IPS” (Pinel and Dehaene, 2010:48).
As it relates to time estimation, similar patterns of activation
are observed during supra-second perception or production tim-
ing tasksandall timing tasks(i.e., even those involving “thinking”
about time) typically activate motor regions such as the basal
ganglia, supplemental motor area (SMA) and pre-SMA (for a
review, see Macar et al., 2002; Kotz and Schwartze, 2011; van
Rijn et al., 2011). It is widely held that relatively small (less
than a second) and longer duration magnitudes (in the seconds
to minutes range) may be represented by different timing sys-
tems (e.g., see Buhusi and Meck, 2005; Jahanshahi et al., 2006;
Buhusi and Cordes, 2011). Sub-second timing may be more
cerebellar-dependent due to this region’s role in motor coordina-
tion, and timing in the supra-seconds range may depend more
upon the basal ganglia and prefrontal regions, as this type of
temporal processing recruits more attentional (switch and accu-
mulator) and working memory processes (see Figure1;s e ea l s o
Hinton and Meck, 1997), however they are not mutually exclu-
sive as cerebellar activation is also found in adult fMRI studies
using supra-second durations (and basal ganglia for millisecond
durations). Similarly, different molecular and neurophysiological
systems underlie interval and circadian (i.e., 24-h) timing (see
Agostino et al., 2011). Given the wealth of such ﬁndings (as it
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relates to humans and adults), a complete account of neuro-
physiological ﬁndings of timing and time perception in adults
is beyond the scope of this review (e.g., but see, Harrington
and Haaland, 1999; Matell and Meck, 2000; Meck and Benson,
2002; Meck, 2003, 2005; Nenadic et al., 2003; Hinton and Meck,
2004; Meck and Malapani, 2004; Pastor et al., 2004; Buhusi and
Meck,2005;Coull etal.,2011;AllmanandMeck,2012). However,
a common feature of many adult neuroimaging studies is the
explicit attempt to dissect the contribution of different timing
components(e.g., clock,memory, anddecisionstages)asitrelates
to a neurobiological instantiation of scalar expectancy theory
(Gibbon et al., 1984).
For example using fMRI, Harrington et al. (2010); see also,
Harringtonetal.(2004)examined patternsofneuralactivity dur-
ing the perceptual (encoding), memory and decision stages of a
duration (and pitch) ordinality task. Encoding of time selectively
activated thestriatum; the striatum wasequallyactive fortime (as
for pitch) during the maintenance stage, and striatal activation
was greatest for time during the decision stage. As acknowledged
by the authors, these ﬁndings are consistent with the SBF model
of interval timing (Matell and Meck, 2004). fMRI studies have
revealed the preSMA and basal ganglia likely serve a function
in the “accumulation processes” as there is increased activation
in these regions to longer durations (e.g., see Coull et al., 2004;
Pouthas et al., 2005); memory processes are likely served by lat-
eral premotor and right inferior frontal corticies (see Rao et al.,
2001; Pouthas et al., 2005) and decision processes by the anterior
c i n g u l a t e( s e ea l s oRao et al., 2001).
In their study, Coull et al. (2004) made use of dynamically
changing visual stimulus attributes (e.g., color and duration),
requiring selective attention (on the part of the participants) to
either dimension. Increasing attentional allocation to time selec-
tively increased activity in acortico-striatal network thatincluded
the pre-supplementary motor area, the right frontal operculum,
and the right putamen.
Harrington et al. (2011) scanned adults while studying the
“sounds are judged longer than lights” effect. Subjective percep-
tions oftime slowing or quickeningwere associated with different
patternsofsuperiortemporal,posteriorinsula,andmiddleoccip-
ital activity, which reveal stronger effective connectivity when
time was dilated. The within-trial evolution of interval timing
has also been examined (Rao et al., 2001), and it was found
that activation in the basal ganglia (right putamen and caudate)
occurredearlyandcontinued intothe trialandwasuniquelyasso-
ciated with encoding time intervals, whereas cerebellar activation
unfolded later, suggesting an involvement of processes other than
explicit timing. Early activation in right inferior parietal cortex
(and bilateral premotor) was associated with encoding, impli-
cating these systems in attention and temporary maintenance
of intervals. Later activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex emerged during comparison of time intervals.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Evidence from infants, children and adults, and non-human ani-
mals, suggests numerical and temporal processes are remarkably
accurate, and conform to qualities of sensory perception (i.e.,
scalar property), across a variety of different methods: behavioral
looking patterns of infants, social timing, behavioral responses in
children as young as 3-years old, and in the electrophysiological
potentials of neurons.
The studies cited in this review tend to supportthe notion that
typical infants possess a “built in” time and number sense (e.g.,
Brannon and Roitman, 2003). Performance on time and number
tasks is modulated by ratio-dependence in children and adults,
and this is found with non-symbolic and symbolic stimuli (e.g.,
Arabic numerals and words). Typically developing 6-month-old
infants revealsensitivity to numerosityin temporalsequencesand
spatialarrays,andsensitivity to time withrespect to deviantdura-
tions, area, speed and distance, but only when constrained by the
1:2 ratio requirement, although this quite quickly develops (over
a few months) to encompass “more difﬁcult” 2:3 ratio sensitivi-
ties. This review has attempted to reconcile such ﬁndings within
a “mode-control” model perspective (Meck and Church, 1983;
Church and Meck, 1984). In this model, temporal and numer-
ical quantity is measured by the accumulation of pulses (in the
run/stop and event modes, respectively).
As studies examining the relative extent of conformities
between magnitude estimation for different dimensions con-
tinue, so too does support for the idea that there is a general
principle (of the type described by the mode-control model)
operating on a multitude of dimensions (of the type described
by ATOM) upon which we rely to make sense of events in
our world (time, area, number, size, distance, speed). However
there is (as yet) no model that is able to provide a complete
account of multi-dimensional magnitude estimation (accumula-
tion) processes. Both types of account predict cross-dimension
interaction effects (between time and number; across different
quantities). Of course, given the co-linearity between time and
numerosity in the mode-control model, and in ATOM (Walsh,
2003), it becomes difﬁcult to dissociate between these two types
of accounts given the aforementioned developmental similarities
between magnitude estimates of time and number.
Infants are able to perform numerical addition and subtrac-
tion, and more advanced temporal and numerical abilities also
require similar forms of arithmetic operations of magnitudes,
such as calculatingspeed (space divided by time) orrate of return
(number divided by time), and number sense appears to be asso-
ciated with math ability. The fact that infants resources are being
directed toward improving sensitivity to different quantities at
such a critical period in brain development, speaks to the impor-
tance of this as a “foundational” ability for other cognitive and
behavioral functions. Of course during infancy, a wide variety
of abilities are starting to take shape (e.g., walking, inhibiting
actions) and it comes as no surprise that the time from birth to
2 years and middle to late childhood is particularly important for
the development of NEUTIN. It will be useful for future research
to identify the precise developmental sequences of sensitivities to
different quantities, and how they relate to other forms of cog-
nitive development (e.g., attention, memory), and to adapt the
mode-control to accommodate ﬁndings for different dimensions
(see also, Lustig, 2011).
Given the literature, it seems likely that a (right-lateralized)
non-symbolic number system provides the foundation for the
(left-lateralized) symbolic number system over the course of
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development (see Cantlon et al., 2009). Across childhood, it
appears the discrimination of analogue magnitudes improves
with age, which is perhaps inextricably linked with the develop-
ment of attentional capacities or the ability to maintain informa-
tion in working memory. There is debate about whether smaller
magnitude estimates (i.e., numerosities) are processed differently
than larger ones. The question of how the brain develops a sense
ofnumberandtimeraisesseriouscomputationalissuesforcogni-
tive neuroscience. As adults, we have the ability to make decisions
based on abstract mental representations of magnitudes of time
(e.g., “do I have enough time to get to the shop”) and com-
plex number abstractions (e.g., calculating change left over from
a purchase at the shop), and of course our attention is dis-
tributed in time and space, and our subjective experience of time
is modulated by attention (see Coull et al., 2004).
It will be important for future research to identify the neu-
ral correlates of time and number representation in children, and
corresponding changes in brain function that underlie normative
developments in these domains (i.e., brain maturation and the
relationship to timing and counting). This is relevant to children
with developmental disabilities, particularly those with apparent
difﬁculty with time and number (e.g., math disability, autism
spectrum disorder, Williams syndrome), as it offers a “bench-to-
bedside” approach with therapeutic potential. For example, there
is evidence that external temporal supports (e.g., picture sched-
ules, timers) are extremely effective in the training and treatment
of individuals with autism, and other neurological populations
who experience problems with cognitive adaptation (for details,
see Allman and Meck, 2012).
Adevelopmentalperspective to time andnumber canalsohelp
unravel interactions among seemingly disparate levels of orga-
nization, such as the molecular biology of gene expression and
the development of cognitive abilities. For example, assuming a
basic deﬁcit in time sense in those with autism spectrum disor-
der, it should follow that aspects of the behavioral phenotype are
related to subtle and early neuropathology that ultimately affects
multiple neural systems involved in number and time represen-
tation, directly and through compensatory experience-dependent
reorganization. This is still yet to be determined, but this idea is
congruouswithcurrenttheories ofautismspectrum disorderthat
emphasize differences in “neural signatures” (Kaiser et al., 2010),
or the adaptive functioning of long-range (multiple neural sys-
tems) in neurocognitive function (Allman, 2011; Barttﬁeld et al.,
2011). Potentially at least, this type of neural-systems approach
to the development of NEUTIN may provide a neural signa-
ture or “endophenotype” that corresponds to impairments in
autism spectrum disorder (and potentially, to co-morbid dis-
orders). The goal for the quest for the “endophenotype” is to
identify pathophysiologicalmechanisms that “cause” the disorder
(Kaiser et al., 2010).
On a ﬁnal note, it is parsimonious (from an ontogenic devel-
opmental perspective) to surmise that our “built in” quantity
sense and “integration” mechanism is likely at the root of our
cognitive ability to think about metaphysical aspects of time and
space, such as pondering how big or old the milky way is, and
what the word “vast” means to our subjective estimations of
magnitude.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by a Pathway to Independence
award to Melissa J. Allman from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver
NationalInstituteofChildHealthandHumanDevelopment(K99
HD058698). The authors are grateful to the reviewers for their
comments.
REFERENCES
A g o s t i n o ,P .V . ,G o l o m b e k ,D .
A., and Meck, W. H. (2011).
Unwinding the molecular basis
of interval and circadian timing.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:64. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2011.00064
Allan, L. G., and Gibbon, J. (1991).
Human bisection at the geometric
mean. Learn. Motiv. 22, 39–58.
Allman, M.J.(2011).Deﬁcitsintempo-
ral processing associated with autis-
tic disorder. Front. Integr. Neurosci.
5:2. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2011.00002
Allman,M.J.,andDeLeon,I.G.(2009).
“No time like the present: time
perception in autism,” in Causes
and Risks for Autism,e d sA .C .
G i o r d a n oa n dV .A .L o m b a r d i( N e w
York, NY: Nova Science Publishers),
65–76.
A l l m a n ,M .J . ,D e L e o n ,I .G . ,a n d
Wearden, J. H. (2011). A psy-
chophysical assessment of timing
in individuals with autism. Am. J.
I n t e l l e c t .D e v .D i s a b i l .116, 165–178.
Allman, M. J., and Meck, W. H.
(2012). Pathophysiological dis-
tortions in time perception
and timed performance. Brain
135, 656–677.
Ansari, D. (2008). Effects of develop-
ment and enculturation on num-
ber representation in the brain. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 9, 278–291.
Ansari, D., and Dhital, B. (2006). Age-
related changes in the activation of
the intraparietal sulcus during non-
symbolic magnitude processing: an
event-related functional magnetic
resonance imaging study. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 18, 1820–1828.
A n s a r i ,D . ,G a r c i a ,N . ,L u c a s ,E . ,
Hamon, K., and Dhital, B. (2005).
Neural correlates of symbolic num-
ber processing in children and
adults. Neuroreport 16, 1769–1773.
A n s a r i ,D . ,D o n l a n ,C . ,T h o m a s ,M .
S. C., Ewing, S. A., Peen, T., and
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2003). What
makes counting count? Verbal and
visuo-spatial contributions to typ-
ical and atypical number develop-
ment. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 85,
50–62.
Antell, S. E., and Keating, D. P. (1983).
Perception of numerical invariance
in neonates. Child Dev. 54, 695–701.
Ashkenazi, S., and Henik, A. (2010).
Attentional networks in develop-
mental dyscalculia. Behav. Brain
Funct. 6, 2.
Ashkenazi, S., Mark-Zigdon, N.,
and Henik, A. (2009). Numerical
distance effect in developmental
dyscalculia. Cogn. Dev. 24, 387–400.
B a c h o t ,J . ,G e v e r s ,W . ,F i a s ,W . ,a n d
Roeyers, H. (2005). Number sense
in children with visuospatial dis-
abilities: orientation of the men-
tal number line. Psychol. Sci. 47,
172–183.
Barkley, R. A., Koplowitz, S., Anderson,
T., and McMurray, M. B. (1997).
Sense of time in children with
ADHD: effects of duration,
distraction and stimulant med-
ication. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 3,
359–369.
B a r t h ,H . ,L aM o n t ,K . ,L i p t o n ,J . ,a n d
Spelke, E. S. (2005). Abstract num-
ber and arithmetic in young chil-
dren.Proc. Natl.Acad.Sci.U.S.A.39,
14117–14121.
B a r t t ﬁ e l d ,P . ,W i c k e r ,B . ,C u k i e r ,S . ,
Navarta, S., Lew, S., and Sigman,
M. (2011). A big-world network
in ASD: dynamical connectiv-
ity analysis reﬂects a deﬁcit in
long-range connections and an
excess of short-range connections.
Neuropsychologia 49, 254–263.
Block,R. A., Zakay, D., and Hancock, P.
A. (1999). Developmental changes
in human duration judgments: a
meta-analytic review. Dev. Rev. 19,
183–211.
Bijeljac-Babic, R., Bertoncini, J., and
Mehler, J. (1993). How to 4-day
old infants categorize multisyl-
labic utterances? Dev. Psychol. 29,
711–721.
Bobin-Bègue, A., Provasi, J., Marks, A.,
and Pouthas, V. (2006). Inﬂuence
of auditory tempo on the endoge-
nous rhythm of non-nutritive suck-
ing. Eur. Rev. Appl. Psychol. 56,
239–245.
Booth, J. L., and Siegler, R. S. (2006).
Developmental and individual dif-
ferences in pure numerical estima-
tion. Dev. Psychol. 42, 189–201.
Booth, J. L., and Siegler, R. S. (2008).
Numerical magnitude representa-
tions inﬂuence arithmetic learning.
Child Dev. 79, 1016–1031.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org M a r c h2 0 1 2|V o l u m e6|A r t i c l e7| 17Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
Boucher, J. (2001). “Lost in a sea of
time: Time-parsing and autism,” in
Time and Memory,e d sC .H o e r l
and T. McCormack (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press), 111–135.
Boucher, J., Pons, F., Lind, S., and
Williams, D. (2007). Temporal cog-
nitionin childrenwith autisticspec-
trum disorder: tests of diachronic
thinking. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 37,
1413–29.
Brannon, E. M. (2002). The devel-
opment of ordinal numerical
knowledge in infancy. Cognition 83,
223–240.
Brannon, E. M., Abbott, S., and Lutz,
D. J. (2004a). Number bias for the
discrimination of large visual sets in
infancy. Cognition 93, B59–B68.
Brannon, E. M., Roussel, L. W., Meck,
W. H., and Woldorff, M. (2004b).
Timing in the baby brain. Cogn.
Brain Res. 21, 227–233.
Brannon, E. M., Libertus, M. E.,
Meck, W. H., and Woldorff, M. G.
(2008). Electrophysiological mea-
sures of time processing in infant
and adult brains: Weber’s law holds.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20, 193–203.
Brannon, E. M., Lutz, D., and Cordes,
S. (2006). The development of
area discrimination and its implica-
tions for number representation in
infancy. Dev Sci. 9, F59–64.
Brannon, E. M., and Roitman, J. D.
(2003). “Nonverbal representations
of time and number in animals
and human infants,” in Functional
and Neural Mechanisms of Interval
Timing,edW .H.M eck(BocaRaton,
FL: CRC Press), 143–182.
Brannon, E. M., Suanda, S., and
Libertus, K. (2007). Temporal dis-
crimination increases in precision
over development and parallels the
development of numerosity dis-
crimination. Dev. Sci. 10, 770–777.
Brannon, E. M., and Terrace, H. S.
(1998). Ordering of the numerosi-
ties 1 to 9 by monkeys. Science 282,
746–749.
Brannon, E. M., and Terrace, H. S.
(2000). Representation of the
numerosities 1–9 by rhesus
macaques (Macaca mulatta). J.
Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process.
26, 31–49.
Brannon, E. M., and Van de Walle, G.
A.(2001). The development ofordi-
nal numerical competence in young
children. Cogn. Psychol. 43, 53–81.
Brannon, E. M., Wusthoff, C. J.,
Gallistel, C. R., and Gibbon, J.
(2001). The subjective scaling of
number representation. Psychol. Sci.
12, 238–243.
Breukelaar, J. W. C., and Dalrymple-
Alford, J. C. (1998). Timing ability
and numerical competence in rats.
J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.Behav. Process.
24, 84–97.
Breukelaar, J. W. C., and Dalrymple-
Alford,J.C.(1999).Effectsoflesions
to the cerebellar vermis and hemi-
spheres on timing and counting in
rats. Behav. Neurosci. 113, 78–90.
Broadbent, H. A., Rakitin, B. C.,
C h u r c h ,R .M . ,a n dM e c k ,W .H .
(1993). “Quantitative relationships
between timing and counting,”
in The Development of Numerical
Competence: Animal and Human
Models, eds S. Boysen and E. J.
Capaldi (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
171–187.
Brown, S. W. (1997). Attentional
resources in timing: interference
effects in concurrent temporal
and non-temporal working mem-
ory tasks. Percept. Psychophys. 5,
1118–1140.
Buckley, P. B., and Gilman, C. B.
(1974). Comparison of digits and
dot patterns. J. Exp. Psychol. 103,
1131–1136.
Bueti, D., and Walsh, V. (2009). The
parietal cortex and the representa-
tion of time, space, number and
other magnitudes. Philos. Trans. R.
Soc.Lond.BBio.Sci.364,1831–1840.
Buhusi, C. V., and Cordes, S. (2011).
Time and number: the privileged
status of small values in the brain.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:67. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2011.00067
Buhusi, C. V., and Meck, W. H. (2005).
What makes us tick? Functional and
neural mechanisms of interval tim-
ing. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6, 755–765.
Buhusi,C.V.,and Meck,W.H.(2009a).
Relative time sharing: new ﬁndings
and an extension of the resource
allocation model of temporal pro-
cessing. P h i l .T r a n s .R .S o c .L o n d .
B Biol. Sci. 364, 1875–1885.
Buhusi,C.V.,andMeck,W.H.(2009b).
Relativity theory and time percep-
tion: single or multiple clocks? PLoS
One 4:e6268. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0006268
Butterworth, B. (2010). Foundational
numerical capacities and the origins
of dyscalculia. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14,
534–541.
Calabria, M., Jacquin-Courtois, S.,
Miozzo, A., Rossetti, Y., Padovani,
A., Cotelli, M., and Miniussi, C.
(2011). Time perception in spatial
neglect: a distorted representation.
Neuropsychology 25, 193–200.
Camos, V. (2009). Numerosity dis-
crimination in children with Down
syndrome. Dev. Neuropsychol. 34,
435–447.
Cantlon, J. F., Brannon, E. M., Carter,
E. J., and Pelphrey, K. A. (2006).
Functional imaging of numer-
ical processing in adults and
four-year-old children. PLoS Biol.
4:0844–0854. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pbio.0040125
Cantlon, J. F., Libertus, M. E., Pinel, P.,
Dehaene, S., Brannon, E. M., and
Pelphrey, K. A. (2009). The neural
development of an abstract concept
of number. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21,
2217–2229.
Cantlon, J. F., Pinel, P., Dehaene, S.,
and Pelphrey, K. A. (2011). Cortical
representations of symbols, objects,
and faces are pruned back during
early childhood. Cereb. Cortex 21,
191–199.
Cantlon, J. F., Safford, K. E.,
and Brannon, E. M. (2010).
Spontaneous analog number rep-
resentations in 3-year-old children.
Dev. Sci. 13, 289–297.
Cappelletti, M., Freeman, E. D., and
Cipolotti, L. (2009). Dissociations
and interactions between time,
numerosity and space processing.
Neuropsychologia 47, 2732–2748.
Cappelletti, M., Freeman, E. D., and
Cipolotti, L. (2011). Numbers and
time doubly dissociate. Neuropsy-
chologia 49, 3078–3092.
Carey, S. (1998). Knowledge of num-
ber: its evolution and ontogenesis.
Science 242, 641–642.
Carey, S. (2001). “On the very pos-
sibility of discontinuties in con-
ceptual development,” in Language,
Brain, and Cognitive Development:
EssaysinHonorofJacques Mehler,ed
E. Dupoux (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press), 303–324.
Carey, S. (2004). Bootstrapping and the
origin of concepts. Daedalus 133,
59–68.
Casini,L., and Ivry,R.B. (1999).Effects
of divided attention on temporal
processing in patients with lesions
of the cerebellum or frontal lobe.
Neuropsychology 13, 10–21.
Casasanto, D., and Boroditsky, L.
(2008). Time in the mind: using
space to think about time. Cognition
106, 579–593.
C a s a r o t t i ,M . ,M i c h i e l i n ,M . ,Z o r z i ,M . ,
and Umiltà, C. (2007). Temporal
order judgment reveals how num-
ber magnitude affects visuospatial
attention. Cognition 102, 101–117.
Chen, K.-M., and Yeh, S.-L. (2009).
Asymmetric cross-modal effects in
time perception. Acta Psychol. 130,
225–234.
C h e n g ,R .K . ,M a c D o n a l d ,C .J . ,a n d
Meck, W. H. (2006). Differential
effects of cocaine and ketamine on
time estimation: implications for
neurobiological models of interval
timing. Pharmacol. Biochem. Behav.
85, 114–122.
Cheng, R. K., MacDonald, C. J.,
Williams, C. L., and Meck, W.
H. (2008). Prenatal choline sup-
plementation alters the timing,
emotion, and memory perfor-
mance (TEMP) of adult male and
female rats as indexed by differ-
ential reinforcement of low-rate
schedule behavior. Learn. Mem. 15,
153–162.
Chiang, H. M., and Lin, Y. H. (2007).
Mathematical ability of students
with Asperger syndrome and
high-functioning autism: a review
of the literature. Autism 11,
547–556.
Chiang, W. C., and Wynn, K. (2000).
Infants’ tracking of objects and col-
lections. Cognition 77, 169–195.
Chochon, F., Cohen, L., van de
Moortele, P. F., and Dehaene, S.
(1999). Differential contributions
of the left and right inferior parietal
lobules to number processing.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 11, 617–630.
Church, R. M., and Broadbent, H. A.
(1990). Alternative representations
of time, number and rate. Cognition
37, 55–81.
C h u r c h ,R .M . ,a n dD e l u t y ,M .Z .
(1977). Bisection of temporal inter-
vals. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav.
Process. 3, 216–228.
Church, R. M., and Gibbon, J. (1982).
Temporal generalization. J. Exp.
Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 8,
165–186.
Church,R.M.,andMeck,W.H.(1984).
“The numerical attribute of stim-
uli,” in Animal Cognition,e d sH .
L. Roitblat, T. G. Bever, and H.
S. Terrace (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
445–464.
C l e a r ﬁ e l d ,M .W . ,a n dM i x ,K .S .
(1999). Number versus contour
length in infants’ discrimination of
small visual sets. Psychol. Sci. 10,
408–411.
Clément, A.,andDroit-Volet,S.(2006).
Counting in a time discrimination
task in children and adults. Behav.
Process. 71, 164–171.
Clifton, R. K. (1974). Heart rate
conditioning in the newborn
infant. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 18,
9–21.
Cohen, L., and Dehaene, S. (1996).
Cerebral networks for number pro-
cessing: evidence from a case of
posterior callosal lesion. Neurocase
155–174.
Cordes, S., and Brannon, E. M. (2009).
Crossingthedivide:infantsdiscrim-
inate small from large numerosities.
Dev. Psychol. 45, 1583–1594.
Cordes, S., Gelman, R., Gallistel, C. R.,
and Whalen, J. (2001). Variability
signatures distinguish verbal from
nonverbal counting for both large
and small numbers. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 8, 698–707.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 7 | 18Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
Cordes, S., Williams, C. L., and Meck,
W. H. (2007). Common represen-
tations of abstract quantities. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 156–161.
C o u l l ,J .T . ,C h e n g ,R .K . ,a n dM e c k ,
W. H. (2011). Neuroanatomical and
neurochemical substrates of timing.
Neuropsychopharmacology 36, 3–25.
Coull, J. T., and Nobre, A. C. (1998).
Where and when to pay atten-
tion: the neural systems for direct-
ing attention to spatial locations
and to time intervals as revealed by
both PET and fMRI. J. Neurosci. 18,
7426–7435.
Coull, J. T., Vidal, F., Nazarian, B.,
and Macar, F. (2004). Functional
anatomy of the attentional modula-
tion of time estimation. Science 303,
1506–1508.
Danckert, J., Ferber, S., Pun, C.,
Broderick,C., Striemer, C., Rock, S.,
and Stewart, D. (2007). Neglected
time: impaired temporal perception
of multisecond intervals in unilat-
eral neglect. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19,
1706–1720.
Dehaene, S. (1997). The Number Sense:
How the Mind Creates Mathematics.
New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Dehaene, S. (2003). The neural basis
of the Weber-Fechner law: a loga-
rithmic mental number line. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 7, 145–147.
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., and Giraux, P.
(1993). The mental representation
of parity and number magnitude.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 122, 371–396.
Dehaene, S., and Brannon, E. M.
(2010). Space, time, and number:
a Kantian research program. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 14, 517–519.
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. (1993).
Development of elementary numer-
ical abilities: a neuronal model.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 5, 390–407.
Dehaene, S., Molko, N., Cohen, L., and
Wilson, A. J. (2004). Arithmetic and
the brain. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 14,
218–224.
D e h a e n e ,S . ,P i a z z a ,M . ,P i n e l ,P . ,a n d
Cohen, L. (2003). Three parietal cir-
cuits for number processing. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 20, 487–506.
Dehaene, S., Spelke, E., Pinel, P.,
Stanescu, R., and Tsivkin, S. (1999).
Sources of mathematical thinking:
behavioral and brain-imaging evi-
dence. Science 284, 970–974.
DeLong, A. J. (1981). Phenomeno-
logical space-time: toward an
experiential relativity. Science 213,
681–683.
de Hevia, M. D., Girelli, L., Bricolo, E.,
and Vallar, G. (2008). The represen-
tational space of numerical magni-
tude: illusions of length. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 61, 1496–1514.
De Smedt, B., Verschaffel, L., and
Ghesqiere, P. (2009). The predictive
value of numerical magnitude com-
parison for individual differences in
mathematics achievement. J. Exp.
Child Psychol. 103, 469–479.
Dormal, V., and Pesenti, M. (2007).
Numerosity-length interference: a
StroopExperiment.Exp.Psychol.54,
289–297.
Dormal, V., Seron, X., and Pesenti,
M. (2006). Numerosity-duration
interference: a Stroop experiment.
Acta Psychol. (Amst) 121, 109–124.
Droit, S. (1994). Temporal regulation
of behavior with an external clock
in 3-year-old children: differences
between waiting and response dura-
tion tasks. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 58,
332–345.
Droit, S. (1995). Learning by doing in
3- and4-year-old children:adapting
to time. Eur. Bull. Cogn. Psychol. 14,
283–299.
Droit, S., Pouthas, V., and Jacquet, A.
Y. (1990). Temporal learning in 4
12- and 6-year-old children: role of
instructions and prior knowledge.
J. Exp. Child Psychol. 50, 305–321.
Droit-Volet, S. (1998). Time estima-
tion in young children: an ini-
tial force rule governing time pro-
duction. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 68,
236–249.
Droit-Volet, S. (2002). Scalar timing in
temporal generalization in children
with short and long durations. Q. J.
Exp. Psychol. A 55, 1193–1209.
Droit-Volet, S. (2003a). “Temporal
experience and timing in chil-
dren,” in Functional and Neural
Mechanisms of Interval Timing,e d
W. H. Meck (Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press LLC), 183–208.
Droit-Volet, S. (2003b). Alerting atten-
tion and time perception in chil-
dren. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 85,
372–384.
Droit-Volet, S.,Cleìment, A.,and Fayol,
M. (2003). Time and number dis-
crimination in a bisection task with
as e q u e n c eo fs t i m u l i :ad e v e l -
opmental approach. J. Exp. Child
Psychol. 84, 63–76.
Droit-Volet, S.,Cleìment, A.,and Fayol,
M. (2008). Time, number and
length: similarities and differences
in discrimination in adults and
children. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 61,
1827–1846.
Droit-Volet, S., Clément, A., and
Wearden, J. H. (2001). Temporal
generalization in 3- to 8-year-old
children. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 80,
271–288.
Droit-Volet, S., and Meck, W. H.
(2007). How emotions colour our
perception of time.Trends Cogn. Sci.
11, 504–513.
Droit-Volet, S., Meck, W. H., and
Penney, T. B. (2007). Sensory
modality and time perception in
children and adults. Behav. Processes
74, 244–250.
Droit-Volet,S.,andRattat, A-C.(1999).
Are time and action dissociated in
young children’s time estimation?
Cogn. Dev. 14, 573–595.
Droit-Volet, S., Tourret, S., and
Wearden, J. (2004). Perception of
the duration of auditory and visual
stimuli in children and adults. Q. J.
Exp. Psychol. A 57, 797–818.
Droit-Volet, S., and Wearden, J. H.
(2001). Temporal bisection in chil-
dren. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 80,
142–159.
Eger,E.,Sterzer,P.,Russ, M.O.,Giraud,
A. L., and Kleinschmidt, A. (2003).
A supramodal number representa-
tion in human intraparietal cortex.
Neuron 37, 719–725.
Eimas, P. D., and Miller, J. L. (1980).
Contextual effects in infant speech
perception. Science 209, 1140–1141.
Emmerton, J. (1998). Numerosity dif-
ferences and effects of stimulus
density on pigeons’ discrimination
performance. Anim. Learn. Behav.
26, 243–256.
Falter, C. M., and Noreika, V. (2011).
Interval timing deﬁcits and abnor-
mal cognitive development. Front.
Integr. Neurosci. 5:26. doi: 10.3389/
fnint.2011.00026
Feigenson, L. (2005). A double-
dissociation in infants’ representa-
tions of object arrays. Cognition 95,
B37–48.
Feigenson, L. (2007). The equality
of quantity. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11,
185–187.
Feigenson, L., Carey, S., and Hauser,
M. D. (2002). Infant’s spontaneous
judgements of ordinality. Psychol.
Sci. 13, 150–156.
Feigenson, L., Carey, S., and Spelke,
E. (2002). Infants’ discrimination
of number vs. continuous extent.
Cogn. Psychol. 44, 33–66.
Feigenson, L., Dehaene, S., and Spelke,
E. (2004). Core systems of number.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 307–314.
F e r o n ,J . ,G e n t a z ,E . ,a n dS t r e r i ,
A. (2006). Evidence of amodal
representation of small numbers
across visuo-tactile modalities in
5-month-old infants. Cogn. Dev. 21,
81–92.
Fetterman, J. G. (1993). Numerosity
discrimination:both timeandnum-
ber matter. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.
Behav. Process. 19, 149–164.
Fetterman, J. G., and MacEwen, D.
(1989). Short-term memory for
responses: the “choose-small”
effect. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 52,
311–324.
Fias, W., Lammertyn, J., Reynvoet,
B . ,D u p o n t ,P . ,a n dO r b a n ,G .A .
(2003). Parietal representation of
symbolic and nonsymbolic magni-
tude. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 15, 47–56.
Fraisse, P. (1967). Psychology of Time.
Paris: PUF.
Frassinetti, F., Magnani, B.,and Oliveri,
M. (2009). Prismatic lenses shift
time perception. Psychol. Sci. 20,
949–954.
Fuson, K. (1992). “Relationships
between counting and cardinality
from age 2 to age 8,” in Pathways
to Number: Children’s Developing
Numerical Abilities, eds J. Bideaud,
C. Meljac, and J. P. Fischer
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates), 349–361.
Gallistel, C. R. (1989). Animal cogni-
tion: the representation of space,
time and number. Ann.Rev. Psychol.
40, 155–189.
Gallistel,C.R.(1990).TheOrganization
of Learning. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Gallistel, C. R., and Gelman, R. (1992).
Preverbal and verbal counting and
computation. Cognition44, 43–74.
Gallistel, C. R., and Gelman, R. (2000).
Non-verbal numerical cognition:
from reals to integers. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 4, 59–65.
Gautier, T., and Droit-Volet, S. (2001).
Attention and time estimation in
5- and 8-year-old children: a dual-
task procedure. Behav. Processes. 28,
57–66.
G e a r y ,D .C . ,H o a r d ,M .K . ,B y r d -
Craven, J., Nugent, L., and Numtee,
C. (2007). Cognitive mechanisms
underlying achievement deﬁcits
in children with mathematical
learning disability. Child Dev. 78,
1343–1359.
Gelman, R., and Cohen, M. (1988).
“Qualitative differences in the way
Down syndrome and normal chil-
dren solve a novel counting prob-
lem,” in The Psychobiology of Down’s
Syndrome, ed L. Nadel (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), 51–99.
Gelman, R., and Cordes, S. (2001).
“Counting in animals and humans,”
in Language, Brain, and Cognitive
Development: Essays in Honor of
Jacques Mehler,e dE .D u p o u x
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
279–301.
Gelman, R., and Gallistel, C. R. (1978).
The Child’s Understanding of
Number. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Gelman, R., and Gallistel, C. R.
(2004). Language and the origin of
numerical concepts. Science 306,
441–443.
Gibbon, J. (1977). Scalar expectancy
theory and Weber’s Law in
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org M a r c h2 0 1 2|V o l u m e6|A r t i c l e7| 19Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
animal timing. Psychol. Rev. 84,
279–325.
Gibbon, J., and Church, R. M. (1981).
Time left: linear versus logarith-
mic subjective time. J. Exp. Psychol.
A n i m .Be h a v .P r o c e s s .7, 87–107.
Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., and Meck,
W.H.(1984).Scalartiminginmem-
ory. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 423, 52–77.
Gibbon, J., Malapani, C., Dale, C. L.,
and Gallistel, C. (1997). Toward
a neurobiology of temporal cogni-
tion: advances and challenges. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 7, 170–184.
Grondin, S., Meilleur-Wells, G., and
Lachance, R. (1999). When to start
explicit counting in a time-intervals
discrimination task: a critical point
in the timing process of humans.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 25, 993–1004.
González-Garrido, A. A., Ruiz-
Sandoval, J. L., Gomez-Velazquez,
F .R . ,d eA l b a ,J .L . ,a n dV i l l a s e n o r -
Cabrera, T. (2002). Hypercalculia in
savant syndrome: central executive
failure. Arch. Med. Res. 33, 586–589.
Gooch, D., Snowling, M., and Hulme,
C. (2011). Time perception,
phonological skills and execu-
tive function in children with
dyslexia and/or ADHD symptoms.
J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 52,
195–203.
Gu, B. M., and Meck, W. H. (2011).
New perspectives on Vierordt’s law:
memory-mixing in ordinal tempo-
ral comparison tasks. Lect. Notes
Comp. Sci. 6789 LNAI, 67–78.
Halberda, J., and Feigenson, L. (2008).
Developmental change in the acuity
of the “Number Sense”: the approx-
imate number system in 3-, 4-, 5-,
and 6- year olds and adults. Dev.
Psychol. 44, 1457–1465.
Harrington, D. L., Boyd, L. A., Mayer,
A. R., Sheltraw, D. M., Lee, R. R.,
Huang, M., and Rao, S. M. (2004).
Neural representation of interval
encoding and decision making.
Cogn. Brain Res. 21, 193–205.
Harrington, D.L., Castillo, G. N., Fong,
C. H.,and Reed, J.D.(2011).Neural
underpinnings of distortions in the
experience of time across senses.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:32. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2011.00032
Harrington, D. L., and Haaland, K.
Y. (1999). Neural underpinnings of
temporal processing: a review of
focal lesion, pharmacological, and
functional imaging research. Rev.
Neurosci. 10, 91–116.
Harrington, D. L., Zimbelman, J. L.,
H i n t o n ,S .C . ,a n dR a o ,S .M .
(2010). Neural modulation of tem-
poral encoding, maintenance, and
decision processes. Cereb Cortex. 20,
1274–1285.
H e n i k ,A . ,R u b i n s t e n ,O . ,a n d
Ashkenazi, S. (2011). The “where”
and “what” in developmental
dyscalculia. Clin. Neuropsychol. 25,
989–1008.
H e i n e ,A . ,T a m m ,S . ,W i s s m a n n ,
J., and Jacobs, A. M. (2011).
Electrophysiological correlates of
non-symbolic numerical magni-
tude processing in children: joining
the dots. Neuropsychologia 49,
3238–3246.
Hinton, S. C., Harrington, D. L.,
Binder, J. R., Durgerian, S., and
Rao, S. M. (2004). Neural systems
supporting timing and chronomet-
ric counting: an FMRI study. Cogn.
Brain Res. 21, 183–192.
Hinton, S. C., and Meck, W. H. (1997).
The ‘internal clocks’ of circadian
and interval timing. Endeavour 21,
82–87.
Hinton, S. C., and Meck, W. H. (2004).
Frontal-striatal circuitry activated
by human peak-interval timing
in the supra-seconds range. Cogn.
Brain Res. 21, 171–182.
Hinton, S. C., and Rao, S. M.
(2004). “One-thousand one ...one-
thousand two ...”: chronometric
counting violates the scalar prop-
ertyinintervaltiming.Psychon.Bull.
Rev. 11, 24–30.
Hoeckner, S. H., Moeller, K., Zauner,
H., Wood, G., Haider, C., Gassner,
A., and Nuerk, H. C. (2008).
Impairments of the mental num-
ber line for two-digit numbers in
neglect. Cortex 44, 429–438.
Holloway, I. D., and Ansari, D. (2010).
Developmental specialization in the
right intraparietal sulcus for the
abstract representation of numeri-
cal magnitude. J. Cogn.Neurosci. 22,
2627–2637.
H o l m e s ,K .J . ,a n dL o u r e n c o ,S .F .
(2009). “Spatial organization of
magnitude in the representa-
tion of number and emotion,”
in Proceedings of the 31th Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society, eds N. A. Taatgen and H.
van Rijn (Austin, TX: Cognitive
Science Society), 2402–2407.
H u b b a r d ,E .M . ,P i a z z a ,M . ,P i n e l ,
P., and Dehaene, S. (2005).
Interactions between number
and space in parietal cortex. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 6, 435–448.
Huntley-Fenner, G. (2001). Children’s
understanding of number is similar
to adults’ and rats’: numerical esti-
mation by 5–7-year-olds. Cognition
78, B27–40.
Huntley-Fenner, G., and Cannon, E.
(2000). Preschoolers’ magnitude
comparisons are mediated by a pre-
verbal analog mechanism. Psychol.
Sci. 11, 147–152.
Huttenlocher, J., Jordan, N. C., and
Levine, S. C. (1994). A mental
model for early arithmetic. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 123, 284–296.
Hyde, D. C. (2011). Two systems of
non-symbolic numerical cognition.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:150. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2011.00150
H y d e ,D .S . ,B o a s ,D .A . ,B l a i r ,C . ,a n d
Carey, S. (2010). Near-infrared
spectroscopy shows right pari-
etal specialization for number in
pre-verbal infants. Neuroimage 53,
647–652.
Hyde, D. C., and Spelke, E. S.
(2011).Neuralsignaturesofnumber
processing in human infants: evi-
dence for two core systems under-
lying numerical cognition. Dev. Sci.
360–371.
Hyde, D. C., and Spelke, E. S. (2012).
Spatiotemporal dynamics of pro-
cessing nonsymbolic number: an
event-related potential source local-
ization study. Hum.Brain Mapp. (in
press).
Izard, V., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., and
Dehaene, S. (2008). Distinct cere-
bral pathways for object identity
and number inhuman infants. PLoS
Biol. 6:e11. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pbio.0060011
Izard, V., Sann, C., Spelke, E. S.,
and Streri, A. (2009). Newborn
infants perceive abstract numbers.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106,
10382–10385.
Jaffe, J., Beebe, B., Feldstein, S., Crown,
C., and Jasnow, M.(2001). Rhythms
of dialogue in infancy. Monogr. Soc.
Res. Child Dev. 66(2SerialNo. 265).
Jahanshahi, M., Jones, C. R.,
Dirnberger, G., and Frith, C.
D. (2006). The substantia nigra pars
compacta and temporal processing.
J. Neurosci. 22, 12266–12273.
Jevons, W. S. (1871). The power of
numerical discrimination. Nature
363–372.
Jones, C. R., Happé, F., Baird, G.,
Simonoff, E., Marsden, A. J., Tregay,
J., Phillips, R. J., Goswami, U.,
Thomson, J. M., and Thompson,
J. M. (2009a). Auditory discrim-
ination and auditory sensory
behaviors in autism spectrum
disorders. Neuropsychologia 47,
2850–2858.
J o n e s ,C .R . ,H a p p é ,F . ,G o l d e n ,
H., Marsden, A. J., Tregay, J.,
Simonoff, E., Pickles, A., Baird, G.,
and Charman, T. (2009b). Reading
and arithmetic in adolescents with
autismspectrumdisorders:peakand
dips in attainment. Neuropsychology
23, 718–728.
Jordan, K. E., and Brannon, E. M.
(2006). The multisensory repre-
sentation of number in infancy.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103,
3486–3489.
J o r d a n ,N .C . ,K a p l a n ,D . ,O l a h ,L .
N., and Locuniak, M. N. (2006).
Number sense growth in kinder-
garten: a longitudinal investigation
of children at risk for mathematics
difﬁculties. Child Dev. 77, 153–175.
Jordan, N. C., Kaplan, D., Locuniak,
M. N., and Ramineni, C. (2007).
Predicting ﬁrst-grade math achieve-
ment from developmental number
sense trajectories. Learn. Disabil.
Res. Pract. 22, 36–46.
Jordan, K. E., Suanda, S. H., and
Brannon,E.M.(2008).Intersensory
redundancy accelerates preverbal
numerical competence. Cognition
108, 210–212.
J or dan,N.C.,K aplan,D .,Ramineni,C.,
and Locuniak, M. N. (2009). Early
math matters: kindergarten number
competence and later mathemat-
ics outcomes. Dev. Psychol. 45,
850–867.
Jusczyk, P. W., Pisoni, D. B., Reed,
M .A . ,F e r n a l d ,A . ,a n dM y e r s ,M .
(1983). Infants’ discrimination of
the duration of a rapid spectrum
change innonspeech signals. Science
222, 175–177.
Kadosh, R. C., Kadosh, K. C., Linden,
D. E. J., Gevers, W., Berger, A.,
and Henik, A. (2005). The brain
locus of interaction between num-
ber and size: a combined func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging
and event-related potential study.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 957–970.
Kahneman, D., Treisman, A., and
Gibbs, B. J.(1992). The reviewing of
object ﬁles: object-speciﬁc integra-
tion of information. Cogn. Psychol.
24, 175–219.
K a i s e r ,M .D . ,H u d a c ,C .M . ,S h u l t z ,S . ,
Lee, S. M., Cheung, C., Berken, A.
M . ,D e e n ,B . ,P i t s k e l ,N .B . ,S u g r u e ,
D .R . ,V o o s ,A .C . ,S a u l n i e r ,C .A . ,
Ventola, P., Wolf, J. M., Klin, A.,
Vander Wyk, B. C., and Pelphrey,
K. A. (2010). Neural signatures of
autism. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
107, 21223–21228.
Kaufmann, L., Koppelstaetter,
F., Siedentopf, C., Haala, I.,
Haberlandt, E., Zimmerhackl, L-B.,
Felber, S., and Ischebeck, A. (2006).
Neural correlates of a number–
size interference task in children.
Neuroreport 17, 587–591.
Kaufmann, L.,andNuerk,H.C.(2006).
Interference effects in a numerical
Stroop paradigm in 9- to 12-year-
old children with ADHD-C. Child
Neuropsychol. 12, 223–243.
Kaufmann L., and Neurk, H. C. (2008).
Basic number processing deﬁcits in
ADHD: a broad examination of
elementary and complex number
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 7 | 20Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
processing skills in 9- to 12-year-old
children with ADHD-C. Dev. Sci.
11, 692–699.
Kaufmann, L., Vogel, S. E., Starke,
M . ,K r e m s e r ,C . ,S c h o c k e ,M . ,a n d
Wood, G. (2009). Developmental
dyscalculia: compensatory mecha-
nisms in left intraparietal regions
in response to nonsymbolic magni-
tudes. Behav.Brain Funct. 5, 35.
K a u f m a n n ,L . ,V o g e l ,S .E . ,W o o d ,
G., Kremser, C., Schocke, M.,
Zimmerhacki, L. B., and Koten, J.
W. (2008). A developmental fMRI
study of nonsymbolic numerical
and spatial processing. Cortex 44,
376–385.
Killeen, P. R., and Fetterman, J. G.
(1988). A behavioral theory of tim-
ing. Psychol. Rev. 95, 274–295.
Kobayashi, T., Hiraki, K., Mugitani,
R., and Hasegawa, T. (2004). Baby
arithmetic: one object plus one
tone. Cognition 91, B23–B34.
Kopec, C. D., and Brody, C. D. (2010).
Human pereformance on the tem-
poral bisection task. Brain Cogn. 74,
262–272.
K o t z ,S .A .E . ,a n dS c h w a r t z e ,M .
(2011). Differential input of the
supplementary motor area to a ded-
icated temporal processing network:
functional and clinicalimplications.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:86. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2011.00086
Krajcsi, A., Lukacs, A., Igacs, J.,
Racsmany, M., and Pleh, C. (2009).
Numerical abilities in Williams
syndrome: dissociating the ana-
logue magnitude system and verbal
retrieval. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol.
31, 439–446.
Kramer, P., Bressan, P., and Grassi, M.
(2011). Time estimation predicts
mathematical intelligence. PLoS
One 6:e28621. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pone.0028621
Kwakye, L. D., Foss-Feig, J. H., Cascio,
C .J . ,S t o n e ,W .L . ,a n dW a l l a c e ,
M. T. (2011). Altered auditory
and multisensory temporal process-
ing in autism spectrum disorders.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 4:129. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2010.00129
L a l l i ,J .S . ,C a s e y ,S . ,G o h ,H . ,a n d
Merlino, J. (1994). Treatment of
escape-maintained aberrant behav-
ior with escape extinction and pre-
dictable routines. J. Appl. Behav.
Anal. 27, 705–714.
Landerl, K., Bevan, A., and
Butterworth, B. (2004). Develop-
mental dyscalculia and basic
numerical capacities: a case study
of 8–9-year-old students. Cognition
93, 99–125.
Le Clec’h, H. G., Dehaene, S., Cohen,
L., Mehler, J., Dupoux, E., Poline, J.
B., Lehéricy, S., van de Moortele, P.
F., and Le Bihan, D. (2000). Distinct
cortical areas for names of num-
bers and body parts independent
of language and input modality.
Neuroimage 12, 381–391.
Le Corre, M., and Carey, S. (2007).
One, two, three, four, nothing more:
an investigation of the conceptual
sources of the verbal counting prin-
ciples. Cognition 105, 395–438.
Le Corre, M., and Carey, S. (2008).
Why the verbal counting principles
are constructed out of representa-
tions of small sets of individuals:
a reply to Gallistel. Cognition 107,
650–662.
Leon, M. I., and Shadlen, M. N. (2003).
Representation of time by neurons
intheposteriorparietalcortexofthe
macaque. Neuron 38, 317–327.
Levin, I. (1977). The development of
time concepts in young children:
reasoning about duration. Child
Dev. 48, 435–444.
Levin, I. (1979). Interference of time
related and unrelated cues with
duration comparisons of young
children: analysis of Piaget’s formu-
lation of the relation of time and
speed. Child Dev. 50, 469–477.
Levin, I. (1982). “The nature and
development of time concepts in
children. The effects of interfer-
ing cues,” in The Developmental
Psychology of Time,e dW .J .
Friedman (New York, NY:Academic
Press), 47–85.
Libertus, M. E., and Brannon, E.
M. (2010). Stable individual differ-
ences in number discrimination in
infancy. Dev. Sci. 13, 900–906.
Libertus, M. E., Feigenson, L., and
Halberda, J. (2011a). Preschool acu-
ity of the approximate number sys-
tem correlates with school math
ability. Dev. Sci. 14, 1292–1300.
Libertus, M. E., Brannon, E. M., and
Woldorff, M. G. (2011b). Parallels
in stimulus-driven oscillatory brain
responses to numerosity changes in
adultsandseven-month-oldinfants.
Dev. Neuropsychol. 36, 651–667.
Libertus, M. E., Pruitt, L. B., Woldorff,
M. G., and Brannon, E. M. (2009).
Induced alpha-band oscillations
reﬂect ratio-dependent number
discrimination in the infant brain.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 2398–2406.
Libertus, M. E., Woldorff, M. G.,
and Brannon, E. M. (2007).
Electrophysiological evidence for
notation independence in numeri-
cal processing. Behav. Brain Funct.
3, 1.
Lipton, J. S., and Spelke, E. S.
(2003). Origins of number sense.
Large-number discrimination in
human infants. Psychol. Sci. 14,
396–401.
Lipton, J. S., and Spelke, E. S. (2005).
Preschool children’s mapping
of number words to nonsym-
bolic numerosities. Child Dev. 76,
978–988.
Loetscher, T., Schwarz, U., Schubiger,
M., and Brugger, P. (2008). Head
t u r n sb i a st h eb r a i n ’ si n t e r n a l
random generator. Curr. Biol. 18,
R60–R62.
Longo, M. R., and Lourenco, S. F.
(2010). Bisecting the mental num-
ber line in near and far space. Brain
Cogn. 72, 362–367.
Lourenco, S. F., and Longo, M. R.
(2010). General magnitude repre-
sentation in human infants. Psychol.
Sci. 21, 873–881.
Lustig, C. (2011). The neuroscience
of time and number: untying
the Gordian knot. Front. Integr.
Neurosci. 5:47. doi: 10.3389/fnint.
2011.00047
Lustig, C., Matell, M. S., and Meck, W.
H. (2005). Not “just” a coincidence:
frontal-striatal synchronization in
working memory and interval tim-
ing. Memory 13, 441–448.
Lustig, C., and Meck, W. H. (2001).
Paying attention to time as one gets
older. Psychol. Sci. 12, 478–484.
Lustig, C., and Meck, W. H. (2005).
Chronic treatment with haloperidol
induces working memory deﬁcits in
feedback effects of interval timing.
Brain Cogn. 58, 9–16.
Lustig, C., and Meck, W. H. (2011).
Modality differences in timing and
temporal memory throughout the
lifespan. Brain Cogn. 77, 298–303.
Macar, F., Lejeune, H., Bonnet, M.,
Ferrara, A., Pouthas, V., Vidal, F.,
and Maquet, P. (2002). Activation
of the supplementary motor area
and of attentional networks during
temporal processing. Exp. BrainRes.
142, 475–485.
Martin, J. S., Poirier, M., and Bowler,
D. M. (2009). Brief report: impaired
temporal reproduction perfor-
mance in adults with autism
spectrum disorder. J. Austim Dev.
Disord. 40, 640–646.
Matell, M. S., Bateson, M., and Meck,
W. H. (2006). Single-trials anal-
yses demonstrate that increases
in clock speed contribute to the
methamphetamine-induced hori-
zontal shifts in peak-inetrval timing
functions. Psychopharmacology 188,
201–212.
Matell, M. S., King, G. R., and Meck,
W. H. (2004). Differential adjust-
ment of interval timing by the
chronic administation of intermit-
tent or continuous cocaine. Behav.
Neurosci. 118, 150–156.
Matell, M. S., and Meck, W. H. (2000).
Neuropsychological mechanisms of
interval timing behavior. Bioessays
22, 94–103.
Matell, M. S., and Meck, W. H. (2004).
Cortico-striatal circuits and inter-
val timing: coincidence-detection of
oscillatory processes. Cogn. Brain
Res. 21, 139–170.
M a t e l l ,M .S . ,M e c k ,W .H . ,a n d
Nicolelis, M. A. L. (2003). Interval
timing and the encoding of sig-
nal duration by ensembles of cor-
tical and striatal neurons. Behav.
Neurosci. 117, 760–773.
Matell, M. S., Shea-Brown, E., Gooch,
C., Wilson, A. G., and Rinzel, J.
(2011).Aheterogeneous population
code for elapsed time in rat medial
agranular cortex. Behav. Neurosci.
125, 54–73.
Matsuzawa, T. (1985). Use of num-
bers by a chimpanzee. Nature 315,
57–59.
Maquet, P., Lejeune, H., Pouthas, V.,
Bonnet, M., Casini, L., Macar,
F., Timsit-Berthier, M., Vidal,
F., Ferrara, A., Degueldre, C.,
Quaglia, L., Delﬁore, G., Luxen, A.,
Woods, R., Mazziotta, J. C., and
Comar, D. (1996). Brain activation
induced by estimation of dura-
tion: a PET study. Neuroimage 3,
119–126.
M c C o r m a c k ,T . ,B r o w n ,G .D .A . ,
M a y l o r ,E .A . ,D a r b y ,R .J . ,a n d
Green, D. (1999). Developmental
changes in time estimation: com-
paring childhood and old age. Dev.
Psychol. 35, 1143–1155.
M c C o r m a c k ,T . ,B r o w n ,G .D . ,S m i t h ,
M. C., and Brock, J. (2004). A
timing-speciﬁc memory disortion
effects in young children. J. Exp.
Child Psychol. 87, 33–56.
McCrink, K., and Wynn, K. (2004).
Large-number addition and sub-
traction by 9-month-old infants.
Psychol. Sci. 15, 776–781.
Meck, W. H. (1983). Selective adjust-
ment of the speed of internal
clock and memory processes. J. Exp.
P s y c h o l .A n i m .B e h a v .P r o c e s s .9,
171–201.
Meck, W. H. (1984). Attentional bias
between modalities: effect on the
internal clock, memory, and deci-
sion stages used in animal time dis-
crimination. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci.
423, 528–541.
Meck, W. H. (1996). Neuropharma-
cology of timing and time percep-
tion. Cogn. Brain Res. 3, 227–242.
Meck, W. H. (1997). “Application of a
mode-control model of temporal
integration to counting and timing
behaviour,” in Time and Behaviour:
Psychological and Neurobiological
Analyses, eds. C. M. Bradshaw and
E.Szabadi (New York, NY: Elsevier),
133–184.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org M a r c h2 0 1 2|V o l u m e6|A r t i c l e7| 21Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
Meck, W. H. (2003). Functional and
Neural Mechanisms of Interval
Timing. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press
LLC.
Meck, W. H. (2005). Neuropsychology
of timing and time perception.
Brain Cogn. 58, 1–8.
Meck, W. H. (2006a). Frontal cortex
lesions eliminate the clock speed
effect of dopaminergic drugs on
interval timing. Brain Res. 1108,
157–167.
Meck,W.H.(2006b).Neuroanatomical
localization of an internal clock: a
functional link between mesolim-
bic, nigrostriatal, and mesocortical
dopaminergic systems. Brain Res.
1109, 93–107.
Meck,W.H.,andBenson,A.M.(2002).
Dissecting the brain’s internal clock:
how frontal-stratial circuitry keeps
time and shifts attention. Brain
Cogn. 48, 195–211.
Meck,W.H.,andChurch,R.M.(1983).
A mode-control model of count-
ing and timing processes. J. Exp.
P s y c h o l .A n i m .B e h a v .P r o c e s s .9,
320–334.
Meck,W.H.,andChurch,R.M.(1987).
Cholinergic modulation of the con-
tent of temporal memory. Behav.
Neurosci. 101, 457–464.
Meck, W. H., Church, R. M., and
Gibbon, J. (1985). Temporal
integration in duration and
number discrimination. J. Exp.
Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 11,
591–597.
Meck, W. H., and Malapani, C.
(2004). Neuroimaging of inter-
val timing. Cogn. Brain Res. 21,
133–137.
M e c k ,W .H . ,P e n n e y ,T .B . ,a n d
Pouthas, V. (2008). Cortico-striatal
representation of time in animals
and humans. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.
18, 145–152.
M e c k ,W .H . ,a n dW i l l i a m s ,C .L .
(1997). Characterization of the
facilitative effects of perinatal
choline supplementation on timing
and temporal memory. Neuroreport
8, 2831–2835.
Melgire, M., Ragot, R., Samson, S.,
Penney, T. B., Meck, W. H., and
Pouthas, V. (2005). Auditory/visual
duration bisection in patients
with left or right medial-temporal
lobe resection. Brain Cogn. 58,
119–124.
Mix, K. S. (1999). Preschoolers’ recog-
nition of numerical equivalence:
sequential sets. J. Exp. Child Psychol.
74, 309–332.
Mix, K. S.,Huttenlocher, J., and Levine,
S. C. (1996). Do preschool children
recognize auditory-visual numeri-
cal correspondences? Child Dev. 67,
1592–1608.
Mix, K. S., Huttenlocher, J.,and Levine,
S.C.(2002).Multiplecuesforquan-
t i ﬁ c a t i o ni ni n f a n c y :i sn u m b e ro n e
ofthem?Psychol.Bull.128,278–294.
Mix, K. S., Moore, J. A., and Holcomb,
E. (2011). One-to-one correspon-
dence promotes numerical equiv-
alence concepts. J. Cogn. Dev. 12,
463–480.
Möhring, W., Libertus, M. E., and
Bertin, E. (2012). Speed discrimina-
tion in 6- and 10-month-old infants
follows Weber’s law. J. Exp. Child
Psychol. 111, 405–418.
Moyer, R. S., and Landauer, T. K.
(1967). Time required for judg-
ments of numerical inequality.
Nature 215, 1519–1520.
Mussolin, C., De Volder, A., Grandin,
C., Schlogel, X., Nassogne, M-C.,
and Noel, M-P. (2009). Neural cor-
relates ofsymbolic number compar-
ison in developmental dyscalculia.J.
Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 860–874.
Myers, G. E. (1971). Williams James
on time perception. Philos. Sci. 38,
353–360.
Naccache, L., and Dehaene, S. (2001).
The priming method: imaging
unconscious repetition priming
reveals an abstract representation of
number in the parietal lobes. Cereb.
Cortex 11, 966–974.
Navon, D. (1978). On a conceptual
hierarchy of time, space, and
other dimensions. Cognition 6,
223–228.
N e n a d i c ,I . ,G a s e r ,C . ,V o l z ,H .P . ,
Rammsayer, T., Hager, F., and Sauer,
H. (2003). Processing of temporal
information and the basal ganglia:
newevidence from fMRI. Exp.Brain
Res. 148, 238–246.
Newcombe, N. S. (2002). The nativist-
empiricist controversy in the con-
text of recent research onspatial and
quantitative development. Psychol.
Sci. 13, 395–401.
N i c h o l l s ,M .E . ,F o r t e ,J .D . ,L o e t s c h e r ,
T . ,O r r ,C .A . ,Y a t e s ,M .J . ,a n d
Bradshaw, J. L. (2011a). Near, yet
so far: the effect of pictorial cues
on spatial attention. Brain Cogn. 76,
349–352.
N i c h o l l s ,M .E . ,L e w ,M . ,L o e t s c h e r ,T . ,
andYates, M.J.(2011b).Theimpor-
t a n c eo fr e s p o n s et y p et ot h er e l a -
tionship between temporal order
and numerical magnitude. Atten.
Percept. Psychophys. 73, 1604–1613.
N i c h o l l s ,M .E .R . ,L o f t u s ,A . ,a n d
Gevers, W. (2008). Look, no hands:
a perceptual task shows that num-
ber magnitude induces shifts of
attention. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 15,
413–418.
Nieder, A. (2004). The number
domain- can we count on parietal
cortex? Neuron 44, 407–409.
Nieder, A., Freedman, D. J., and Miller,
E. K. (2002). Representation of the
quantity of visual items in the pri-
mate prefrontal cortex. Science 297,
1708–1711.
Nieder, A., and Miller, E. K. (2003).
Coding of cognitive magnitude:
compressed scaling of numerical
information in the primate pre-
frontal cortex. Neuron 37, 149–157.
Nieder, A., and Miller, E. K. (2004a).
Analog numerical representations
in Rhesus monkeys: evidence
for parallel processing. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 16, 889–901.
Nieder, A., and Miller, E. K. (2004b).
A parieto-frontal network for visual
numerical information in the mon-
key. Proc. Natl.Acad. Sci.U.S.A.101,
7457–7462.
Nye, J., Fluck, M., and Buckley, S.
(2001). Counting and cardinal
u n d e r s t a n d i n gi nc h i l d r e nw i t h
Down syndrome and typically
developing children. Down Syndr.
Res. Pract. 7, 68–78.
O’Hearn, K., Hoffman, J. E., and
Landau, B. (2011). Small subitizing
r a n g ei np e o p l ew i t hW i l l i a m ss y n -
drome. Vis. Cogn. 19, 289–312.
O’Hearn, K., and Luna, B. (2009).
Mathematical skillsinWilliamssyn-
drome: Insight into the importance
of underlying representations. Dev.
Disabil. Res. Rev. 15, 11–20.
O’Hearn, K., and Landau, B. (2007).
Mathematical skill in individuals
with Williams syndrome: evidence
from a standardized mathematics
battery. Brain Cogn. 64, 238–246.
Oliveri, M., Vicario, C. M., Salerno, S.,
Koch, G., Turriziani, P., Mangano,
R., Chillemi, G., and Caltagirone,
C. (2008).Perceiving numbersalters
time perception. Neurosci. Lett. 438,
308–311.
Ornstein, R. (1969). On the Experience
of Time. Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin.
P a s t o r ,M .A . ,D a y ,B .L . ,M a c a l u s o ,
E . ,F r i s t o n ,K .J . ,a n dF r a c k o w i a k ,
R. S. (2004). The functional neu-
roanatomy of temporal discrimina-
tion. J. Neurosci. 24, 2585–2591.
Paterson, S. J., Girelli, L., Butterworth,
B., and Karmiloff-Smith, A.
(2006). Are numerical impair-
ments syndrome speciﬁc? Evidence
from Williams syndrome and
Down’s syndrome. J. Child Psychol.
Psychiatry 47, 190–204.
Penney, T. B., Gibbon, J., and Meck,
W. H. (2000). Differential effects of
auditory and visual signals on clock
speed and temporal memory. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26,
1770–1787.
Penney, T. B., Gibbon, J., and Meck,
W. H. (2008). Categorical scaling
of duration bisection in pigeons
(Columba livia), mice (Mus muscu-
lus), and humans (homo sapiens).
Psychol. Sci.19, 1103–1109.
Pepperberg, I. M. (2006). Ordinality
and inferential abilities of a
Grey Parrot (Psittacus erithacus).
J. Comp. Psychol. 120, 205–216.
Pesenti, M., Thioux, M., Seron, X.,
and De Volder, A. (2000). Neuro-
anatomical substrates of Arabic
numberprocessing, numericalcom-
parison, and simple addition: a PET
study.J.Cogn.Neurosci.12,461–479.
Pessoa, L., and Desimone, R. (2003).
From humble neural beginnings
comes knowledge of numbers.
Neuron 37, 4–6.
Pezzulo, G., and Rigoli, F. (2011). The
value of foresight: how prospec-
tion affects decision-making, Front.
Neurosci. 5:79. doi: 10.3389/fnins.
2011.00079
Piaget, J. (1946). The Development of
the Notion of Time in Children.
Paris: PUF.
Piaget, J.(1952).TheChild’s Conception
of Number. New York, NY: Norton.
Piazza, M., Izard, V., Pinel, P., Le Bihan,
D., and Dehaene, S. (2004). Tuning
curves for approximate numerosity
in the human intraparietal sulcus.
Neuron 44, 547–555.
Piazza, M., Mechelli, A., Butterworth,
B., and Price, C. J. (2002). Are
subitizing and counting imple-
mented as separate or functionally
overlapping processes? Neuroimage
15, 435–446.
P i a z z a ,M . ,P i n e l ,P . ,L eB i h a n ,D . ,a n d
Dehaene, S. (2007). A magnitude
code common to numerosities and
number symbols in human intra-
parietal cortex. Neuron 53, 293–305.
Pinel, P., and Dehaene, S. (2010).
Beyond hemispheric dominance:
brain regions underlying the joint
lateralization of language and
arithmetic to the left hemisphere.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 48–66.
Pinel, P., Dehaene, S., Rivière, D.,
andLeBihan,D.(2001).Modulation
of parietal activation by semantic
distance in a number comparison
task. Neuroimage 14, 1013–1026.
Pinel, P., Piazza, M., Le Bihan, D., and
Dehaene, S. (2004). Distributed
and overlapping cerebral repre-
sentations of number, size, and
luminance during comparative
judgments. Neuron 41, 983–993.
Porter, J. (1999). Learning to count:
ad i f ﬁ c u l tt a s k ?Down Syndr. Res.
Pract. 6, 85–94.
Pouthas, V. (2003). “Electrophy-
siological evidence for speciﬁc
processing of temporal information
in humans,” in Functional and
Neural Mechanisms of Interval
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 7 | 22Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
Timing,e dW .H .M e c k( B o c a
Raton, FL: CRC Press LLC),
439–456.
Pouthas, V., Droit, S., Jacquet, A. Y.,
and Wearden, J. (1990). Temporal
differentiation of response dura-
tion in children of different ages:
developmental changes in relations
between verbal and nonverbal
behavior. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 53,
21–31.
Pouthas, V., George, N., Poline, J.
B., Pfeuty, M., Vandemoorteele, P.
F., Hugueville, L., Ferrandez, A.
M., Lehéricy, S., Lebihan, D., and
Renault, B. (2005). Neural net-
work involved in time perception:
an fMRI study comparing long
and short interval estimation. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 25, 433–441.
Provasi, J., Rattat, A. C., and Droit-
Volet, S. (2011). Temporal bisection
in 4-month olds. J. Exp. Psychol.
Anim. Behav. Process. 37, 108–113.
R a o ,S .M . ,M a y e r ,A .R . ,a n d
Harrington, D. L. (2001). The
evolution of brain activation during
temporal processing. Nat. Neurosci.
4, 317–323.
Rattat, A. C., and Droit-Volet, S.
(2005). The long-term retention of
time: a developmental study. Q. J.
Exp. Psychol. B 58, 163–176.
R e v k i n ,S .K . ,P i a z z a ,M . ,I z a r d ,V . ,
Cohen, L., and Dehaene, S. (2008).
Does subitizing reﬂect numerical
estimation? Psychol. Sci. 19,
607–614.
R i v e r a ,S .M . ,R e i s s ,A .L . ,E c k e r t ,
M. A., and Menon, V. (2005).
Developmental changes in mental
arithmetic: evidence for increased
functional specialization in the
left inferior parietal cortex. Cereb.
Cortex 15, 1779–1790.
Roberts, W. A. (1995). Simultaneous
numerical and temporal processing
in the pigeon. C u r r .D i r .P s y c h o l .S c i .
4, 47–51.
Roberts, W. A. (2002). Are animals
stuck in time? Psychol. Bull. 128,
473–489.
Roberts, W. A., and Boisvert, M. J.
(1998). Using the peak procedure to
measure timing and counting pro-
cesses in pigeons. J. Exp. Psychol.
Anim. Behav. Process. 24, 416–430.
Roberts, W. A., Coughlin, R., and
Roberts, S. (2000). Pigeons ﬂexibly
time or count on cue. Psychol. Sci.
11, 218–222.
Roberts, W. A., Macuda, T., and
Brodbeck, D. R. (1995). Memory
f o rn u m b e ro fl i g h tﬂ a s h e si nt h e
pigeon. Anim. Learn. Behav. 23,
182–188.
Roberts, W. A., and Mitchell, S. (1994).
Can a pigeon simultaneously
process temporal and numerical
information? J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.
Behav. Process. 20, 66–78.
Roitman, J. D., Brannon, E. M.,
Andrews, J. R., and Platt, M. L.
(2007). Nonverbal representation
of time and number in adults. Acta
Psychol. 124, 296–318.
Rousselle, L., and Noël, M. P. (2007).
Basic numerical skills in children
with mathematics learning disabil-
ities: a comparison of symbolic
vs. non-symbolic number mag-
nitude processing. Cognition 102,
361–395.
Rousselle, L., Palmers, E., and Noel,
M. P. (2004). Magnitude compar-
ison in preschoolers: what counts?
Inﬂuence of perceptual variables.
J. Exp. Child Psychol. 87, 57–84.
Rubinsten, O., and Henik, A. (2005).
Automatic activation of internal
magnitudes: astudyofdevelopmen-
tal dyscalculia. Neuropsychology 5,
641–648.
Rumbaugh, D. M., Savage-Rumbaugh,
S., and Hegel, M. T. (1987).
Summation in the chimpanzee (Pan
troglodytes). J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.
Behav. Process. 13, 107–115.
Sandhofer, C. M., and Smith, L.
B. (1999). Learning color words
involves learning a system of map-
pings. Dev. Psychol. 35, 668–679.
Santens, S.,Roggeman, C.,Fias,W.,and
Verguts, T.(2010). Number process-
ing pathways in human parietal cor-
tex. Cereb. Cortex 20, 77–88.
S a r r a z i n ,J .C . ,G i r a u d o ,M .D . ,
Pailhous, J., and Bootsma, R. J.
(2004). Dynamics of balancing
space and time in memory: tau
and kappa effects revisited. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 30,
411–430.
S c h u b o t z ,R .I . ,F r i e d e r i c i ,A .D . ,a n d
von Cramon, D. Y. (2000). Time
perception and motor timing: a
common cortical and subcortical
basis revealed by fMRI. Neuroimage
11, 1–12.
Schubotz, R. I., and von Cramon, D. Y.
(2001). Interval and ordinal prop-
erties of sequences are associated
with distinct premotor areas. Cereb.
Cortex 11, 210–222.
Sereno, M. I., Pitzalis, S., and Martinez,
A. (2001). Mapping of contralateral
space in retinotopic coordinates by
a parietal cortical area in humans.
Science 294, 1350–1354.
Shuman,M.,andKanwisher,N.(2004).
Numerical magnitude in the human
parietal lobe; tests of representa-
tional generality and domain speci-
ﬁcity. Neuron 44, 557–569.
Siegel, L. S. (1974). Heterogeneity and
spatial factors as determinants of
numeration ability. Child Dev. 45,
532–534.
Siegler, R. S., and Booth, J. L. (2004).
Development of numerical estima-
tion in young children. Child Dev.
75, 428–444.
Siegler, R. S., and Ramani, G. B.
(2009). Playing linear number
board games-but not circular ones-
improves low-income preschoolers’
numerical understanding. J. Educ.
Psychol. 101, 545–560.
Simen, P., Balci, F., deSouza, J., Cohen,
J.D.,andHolmes,P.(2011).Interval
timing by long-range temporal inte-
gration. Front. Integr.Neurosci. 5:28.
doi: 10.3389/fnint.2011.00028
S i m o n ,O . ,K h e r i f ,F . ,F l a n d i n ,G . ,
Poline, J. B., Riviere, D., Mangin,
J. F., LeBihan, D., and Dehane, S.
(2004). Automatized clustering and
functional geometry of human pari-
etofrontal networks for language,
space and number. Neuroimage 23,
1192–1202.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior
of Organisms. New York, NY:
Appleton-Century.
Skinner, B. F. (1948). “Superstition”
in the pigeon. J. Exp. Psychol. 38,
168–172.
Smith, L. B., and Sera, M. D. (1992). A
developmental analysis of the polar
structure of dimensions. Cogn.
Psychol. 24, 99–142.
Smith, A. B., Taylor, E., Brammer, M.,
Halari, R., and Rubia, K. (2008).
Reduced activation in right lat-
eral prefrontal cortex and anterior
cingulated gyrus in medication-
naïve adolescents with attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder dur-
ing time discrimination. J. Child
Psychol. Psychiatry 49, 977–985.
Spaepen, E., Coppola, M., Spelke, E. S.,
Carey, S. E., and Goldin-Meadow, S.
(2011). Number without a language
model. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
108, 3163–3168.
Spelke, E. (2000). Core knowledge. Am.
Psychol. 55, 1233–1243.
Spelke, E. (2011). Quinian bootstrap-
ping or Fodorian combination?
Core and constructed knowledge
of number. Behav. Brain Sci. 34,
149–150.
Starkey, P. (1992). The early devel-
opment of numerical reasoning.
Cognition 43, 93–126.
Starkey,P.,and Cooper, R.G. Jr.(1980).
Perception of numbers by human
infants. Science 210, 1033–1035.
Starkey, P., Spelke, E. S., and
Gelman, R. (1983). Detection of
intermodal numerical correspon-
dences by human infants. Science
222, 179–181.
Starkey, P., Spelke, E. S., and Gelman,
R. (1990). Numerical abstraction
by human infants. Cognition 36,
97–127.
Strauss, M. S., and Curtis, L. E. (1981).
Infant perception of numerosity.
Child Dev. 52, 1146–1152.
Stern, D., and Gibbon, J. (1978).
“Temporal expectancies of social
behaviors in mother-infant play,”
in Origins of the Infant’s Social
Responsiveness,ed.E.Thoman (New
York, NY: Wiley), 409–429.
Szelag, E., Kowalska, J., Galkowski, T.,
and Poppel, E. (2004). Temporal
processing deﬁcits in high-
functioning children with autism.
Br. J. Psychol. 95, 269–282.
Szucs, D., and Soltesz, F. (2007).
Event-related potentials dissoci-
ate facilitation and interference
effects in the numerical Stroop
paradigm. Neuropsychology 45,
3190–3202.
Temple, C. M. (1992). “Developmental
dyscalculia,” in Handbook of
Neuropsychology: Vol. 7, Child
Neuropsychology, eds S.J. Segalowitz
and I. Rapin (New York, NY:
Elsevier), 211–222.
Temple, E., and Posner, M. I. (1998).
Brain mechanisms of quantity are
similar in 5-year-old children and
adults. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
95, 7836–7841.
Thioux, M., Stark, D. E., Klaiman, C.,
and Schulz, R. T. (2006). The day
of the week when you were born in
700ms: calendar computation in an
Autisticsavant.J.Exp.Psychol.Hum.
Percept. Perform. 32, 1155–1168.
Trehub, S. E., and Thorpe, L. A. (1989).
Infants’ perception of rhythm: cate-
gorization of auditory sequences by
temporal structure. Can. J. Psychol.
43, 217–229.
Treisman, M. (1984). Temporal
rhythms and cerebral rhythms.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 423, 542–565.
T r i c k ,L .M . ,a n dP y l y s h y n ,Z .W .
(1994). Why are small and large
numbers enumerated differently?
A limited-capacity preattentive
stage in vision. Psychol. Rev. 101,
80–102.
Valko, L., Schneider, G., Doehnert,
M . ,M ü l l e r ,U . ,B r a n d e i s ,D . ,
Steinhausen, H-C., and Drechsler,
R. (2010). Time processing in
children and adults with ADHD. J.
Neural. Transm. 117, 1213–1228.
Van Herwegen, J., Ansari, D., Xu, F.,
and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2008).
Small and large number process-
ing in infants and toddlers with
Williams syndrome. Dev. Sci. 11,
637–643.
van Loosbroek, E., and Smitsman, A.
D. (1990). Visual perception of
numerosity in infancy. Dev. Psychol.
26, 916–922.
van Marle, K., and Wynn, K. (2006).
Six-month old infants use analog
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org M a r c h2 0 1 2|V o l u m e6|A r t i c l e7| 23Allman et al. Neuroscience of time and number
magnitudes to represent duration.
Dev. Sci. 9, F41–49.
van Rijn, H., Kononowicz, T. W., Meck,
W. H., Ng, K. K., and Penney,
T. B. (2011). Contingent negative
variation and its relation to time
estimation: a theoretical evaluation.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:91. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2011.00091
Vicario, C. M. (2011). Perceiving num-
bers affects the subjective temporal
midpoint. Perception 40, 23–29.
Vicario, C. M., Caltagirone, C., and
Oliveri, M. (2007). Optokinetic
stimulation affects temporal esti-
mation in healthy humans, Brain
Cogn. 64, 68–73.
Von Gast, H. (1957). Der Umgang
mit Zahlen und Zahlge- bilden in
der frühen Kindheit. Zeitschrift für
Psychologie 161, 1–90.
Vuilleumier, P., Ortigue, S., and
Brugger, P. (2004). The number
space and neglect. Cortex 40,
399–410.
Wackermann, J. (2008). Measure of
time: a meeting point of psy-
chophyscis and fundamental
physics. Mind Matter 6, 9–50.
Wallace, G. L., and Happé, F. (2008).
Time perception in autism spec-
trum disorders. Res. Autism Spectr.
Disord. 2, 447–455.
Walsh, V. (2003). A theory of magni-
tude: common cortical metrics of
time, space and quantity. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 7, 483–488.
Washburn, D. A. (1994). Stroop-like
effects for monkeys and humans:
processing speed or strength
of association? Psychol. Sci. 5,
375–379.
Washburn, D. A., and Rumbaugh,
D. M. (1991). Ordinal judgments
of numerical symbols by macaques
(Macaca Mulatto).Psychol. Sci. 2,
190–193.
Wearden, J.H. (1991).Do humans pos-
sess an internal clock with scalar
timing properties? Learn. Motiv. 22,
59–83.
Wearden,J.H.(2005).“The wrongtree:
time perception and time experi-
ence inthe elderly,”inMeasuringthe
Mind: Speed, Age and Control,e d s .J .
D u n c a n ,L .P h i l i p s ,a n dP .M c L e o d
(Oxford: Oxford University Press),
137–158.
Wearden, J. H., Edwards, H., Fakhri,
M., and Percival, A. (1998). Why
“sounds are judged longer than
lights”:applicationof amodel of the
internal clock in humans. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 51B, 97–120.
Wearden, J. H., and Ferrara, A. (1995).
Stimulus spacing effects in tempo-
ral bisection by humans. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 48B, 289–310.
Wearden, J. H., and Ferrara, A. (1996).
Stimulus range effects in tempo-
ral bisection by humans. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 49B, 24–44.
Whalen,J.,Gallistel, C.R.,andGelman,
R. (1999). Non-verbal counting in
humans: the psychophysics of num-
ber representation. Psychol. Sci. 10,
130–137.
Wilkening, F., Levin, I., and Druyan, S.
(1987). Children’s counting strate-
gies for time quantiﬁcation and
integration. Dev. Psychol. 23,
822–883.
Williams, C. L. (2011). Sex differ-
ences in counting and timing.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:88. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2011.00088
Wimpory, D. (2002). Social timing,
clock genes and autism: a new
hypothesis. J. Intellect. Disabil. Res.
46, 352–358.
Wood, J. N., and Spelke, E. (2005).
Infants’ enumeration of actions:
numerical discrimination and its
signaturelimits.Dev.Sci.8,173–181.
Wynn, K. (1990). Children’s under-
standing of counting. Cognition 36,
155–193.
Wynn, K. (1992). Addition and sub-
traction by human infants. Nature
358, 749–750.
Wynn, K. (1995). Infants possess a sys-
tem of numerical knowledge. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 4, 172–177.
Wynn, K. (1996). Infants’ individua-
tion and enumeration of actions.
Psychol. Sci. 7, 164–169.
Wynn, K. (1998). Psychological foun-
dations of number: numerical com-
petence in human infants. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 2, 296–303.
Wynn, K., Bloom, P., and Chiang, W-
C. (2002). Enumeration of collec-
tive entities by 5-month-old infants.
Cognition 83, B55–B62.
Wynn, K., and Chiang, W-C. (1998).
Limits to infants’ knowledge of
objects: the case of magical appear-
ance. Psychol. Sci. 9, 448–455.
Xu, F. (2003). Numerosity discrimina-
tion in infants: evidencefor two sys-
tems of representations. Cognition
89, B15–B25.
Xu, F., and Spelke, E. (2000). Large
number discrimination in 6-
month-old infants. Cognition 74,
B1–B11.
Xu, F., Spelke, E. S., and Goddard, S.
(2005). Number sense in human
infants. Dev. Sci. 8, 88–101.
Xuan, B., Zhang, D., He, S., and Chen,
X. C. (2007). Larger stimuli are
judged to last longer. J. Vis. 7, 1–5.
Zélanti, P. S., and Droit-Volet, S.
(2011). Cognitive abilities explain-
ing age-related changes in time per-
ception of short and long dura-
tions. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 109,
143–157.
Zentall,S.S.,Smith,Y .N.,Lee,Y .B.,and
Wieczorek, C. (1994). Mathematical
outcomes ofattention-deﬁcit hyper-
activity disorder. J. Learn. Disabil.
27, 510–519.
Zur, O., and Gelman, R. (2004).
Young children can add and
subtract by predicting and check-
ing. Early Child. Res. Q. 19,
121–137.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 01 August 2011; paper pend-
ingpublished:14October 2011; accepted:
10 February 2012; published online: 06
March 2012.
Citation: Allman MJ, Pelphrey KA and
Meck WH (2012) Developmental neuro-
science of timeandnumber: implications
for autism and other neurodevelopmen-
tal disabilities. Front. Integr. Neurosci.
6:7. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00007
Copyright © 2012 Allman, Pelphrey
and Meck. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Non
Commercial License, which permits
non-commercial use, distribution, and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 7 | 24